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This document contains the research I conducted from September 2004 to June 2008. The
three chapters that follow this preface, plus the preface itself, constitutes my Ph.D. dis-
sertation at the Department of Economics at the European University Institute (Florence,
Italy).
There has been several people that, during these four years, have been of key importance
to fullling the task of writing my PhD. thesis. I would like to start thanking my mother and
brother, who, at rst upset with my decision of moving to Italy, have always been available
and ready to cheer me up in the hardest moments. This thesis is dedicated to them.
My supervisor, Professor Karl Schlag, has been of invaluable help for accomplishing the
task of writing my Ph.D. thesis. His guidance during this four years have made me understand
this profession in depth and, although I still have much to learn, has turned me into a great
young academic with very high potential. There has been two other professors that I believe
deserve special mention. Professor Pascal Courty has always been a great asset as a person
with whom to discuss ideas from a dierent perspective. While Professor Schlag works on the
theoretical side of our science, Professor Courty works on the applied side. This combination
has been extremely useful to me as for any idea I came up with I always had two dierent
yet equally valuable opinions.
Professor Larry Samuelson was my mentor during my visit to the University of Wisconsin-
Madison from September 2006 to December 2006. During this period Professor Samuelson
acted as my main advisor and for that I am indebted with him. Professor Samuelson was of
great help for my development as a theoretical economist. Most of the second chapter of this
dissertation was written while I was visiting the University of Wisconsin-Madison under the
supervision of Professor Samuelson.
Other colleagues and friends have been of very valuable help and support for me during
this four years. These include my friends here in Florence as well as my friends back in
Alicante. You know who you are, thank you so much for everything.
In the remainder of this introduction I introduce, in an informal way, the three chapters
that are to come. Hence, the next three subsections contain a non-technical summary of my
Ph.D. dissertation that are aimed readers that are not familiar with the economic literature
in general and with game theory in particular.
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Chapter 1 - Friendship Selection1
In the rst chapter of my dissertation I aim at understanding some of the most well known
and recognized phenomena about friendship relations between human beings. Before get-
ting deeper into these phenomena, however, let me start by saying few a words about the
relationship between friendship relations and economics.
Economics is not the science of money. It is the science aimed at studying decision making
in situations involving scarce resources. These types of decisions range from which university
degree to study to where to go on our next holidays. It is natural to think about money
when thinking about economics as money is a scarce resource that we constantly use in our
everyday life.
Many economic theories exists on how to optimally allocate our time between work and
leisure. Furthermore, many theories explain such things as how agents make job decisions,
how many years of education to acquire, or whether to invest now in a pension fund or to
wait for better fundamentals. However, very few theories exist that explain how the scarce
resource of leisure is employed by agents. In particular, no economic theory exists on how
people use their leisure time to choose with whom to have friendship relations. Given the
relevance in society of the social contacts in general and friends in particular I study how
friendship arises in a network of people. The rst chapter of my dissertation is then aimed at
understanding how friends are selected given the impossibility of being friends with everybody
as friendship relations involve costs (eort, time, etc.).
I model friendship as repeated interaction between a group of agents. Interactions between
the group of agents is modeled as a two-step decision. First, each agent decides with every
other agent whether to join in a relationship or not. Joining a relationship involves a benet
that is not player specic and a cost that is player specic. This benet is interpreted as
the joy a player gets from being in a relationship while this cost is interpreted as the degree
to which agents needs help in a relationship. Second, for every two agents that decided to
be joined together in a relationship, they decide whether or not to help the other. Helping
involves a cost for the person providing help but a benet for the person receiving help.
If two agents do not agree on joining a relationship, they remain as strangers. If two
agents decide on joining a relationship but are not helping each other, we say they are mates
1Many thanks to Karl Schlag, Pascal Courty, Anna Orlik, Ilan Eshel, Itai Agur and Sanne Zwart for very
useful comments and discussions on this chapter. I also would like to thank the seminar participants at the
European University Institute and University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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10.2870/26189because although having a relationship, this relationship is not strong enough to consider
them as friends. Finally, if two agents decide on joining a relationship and are helping each
other, we say they are friends.
As just mentioned in the paragraph above, each of the agents in the group is characterized
by the degree to which they, if joined in a relationship with the other agent, need help. Hence,
there are agents who constantly, and in each of its relationships, need help to a high degree
and there are other agents who will barely need help at all. Players with a high degree of
needing help prefer not to join a relationship over being mates with someone, as being in a
relationship might involve a cost higher that the benet from being in a relationship. Players
with a low degree of needing help prefer to have a relationship of either of the two types
(mates and friends) over not joining the relationship at all since the benet from being in a
relationship, independently on whether they receive and provide help, are greater than the
cost of needing help. The degree to which a player needs help is what makes her dierent
from the other players. We say that two agents are similar if they have a similar degree of
needing help.
The decision of helping an agent with whom one is having a relationship is a type of
Prisoners' Dilemma problem. Agents like to be helped as it involves benets to them, however,
since helping is costly, agents also prefer not to oer help. In this cooperative setting I nd the
following: for agents who need help to a relatively small degree, a friendship relationship is
possible only if the dierences in the degree to which each of this players need help is similar.
That is, in this case similarity, also known as homophily, plays the key role in determining
if two agents can become friends or not. This is because if an agent with a low degree of
needing help joins in a relationship with an agent with a high degree of needing help, the low
degree agent might have an incentive to stop oering help to the other agent and move their
situation to a mate relationship.
However, when one of the players has a high degree of needing help, high enough so that
a mate relationship is less benecial than no relationship at all, then the dierence between
the degrees of needing help of each agent plays no role in determining whether the two agents
can become friends or not. In this situation the incentives of breaking the friendship relation
of the low degree agent might be smaller than if the other agent was also a low type. This
is because if a friendship relation with the high type is broken, then these two agents will
become strangers as the high type prefers not to be in a relationship over being in a mate
relationship. Hence, the costs of breaking the relationship for the low degree type are high
as breaking a relationship will mean not having any relationship at all. In this situation the
key for determining if two player can become friends is the prot each player is getting from
the relationship independently of the dierence of their degrees of needing help.
vii
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10.2870/26189Once the role of homophily in a friendship relation is understood, I move to study how
friendships are selected when players have a time constraint by which they can only have a
xed maximum number of friends. Hence, the question now is not who can be friends with
who, but rather the following: among those with whom an agent could be friends, which ones
are actually going to become this agents friends? That is, if the possibility for two agents of
becoming friends is not high enough, there is now a process for selecting friendships. I model
the selection process as a random event by which at every moment only one agent is allowed
to oer new relationships. This random selection process represents the fact that in the real
world friendship relations arise as a result of a complex meeting-new-people process.
I nd that unless all agents in the population are dierent enough it is impossible to
predict which friendship relations will arise in equilibrium. Given that there exists a certain
degree of substitutability between agents, if two or more agents are similar in that they have a
similar degree of needing help, then the random process by which people make new friendship
will determined the equilibrium outcome. I also nd that the out of equilibrium length of a
friendship relation is directly in
uenced by the degree to which agents discount the future.
Impatient agents tend to have shorter friendship relations, an observation that is in line with
empirical studies.
In the last part of this chapter I present robustness checks of the model and relate my
results with the empirical literature on friendship. Among other ndings, I nd the model to
be robust to dierent specications of the cooperative strategies of the agents. I also illustrate
how my results match empirical evidence reported on friendship.
Chapter 2 - Learning within a Markovian Environment2
In this chapter I explore human decision making in a situation where there are two alternatives
and the outcome or benets from each of these alternatives is unknown to the agents. Agents
are faced with the situation of making a choice from a set of alternatives repeatedly over time.
Although oblivious of the payo players get from making the choices, they can learn from
their past experiences or from observing the choices of other agents. This decision problem
is faced by many of us in our everyday lives: such as whether to buy a PC or a Mac, whether
to have fruit or a cake as a dessert in a restaurant, or whether to watch an action movie or
a romantic movie at the theater.
The outcome of each of the two available choices depends on a random, non-stationary,
2Part of this chapter was written during my visit to the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful
to the faculty at UW and the participants in the Theory Lunch. I would like to thank Karl Schlag and
Larry Samuelson for useful discussions and comments. I would also like to thank Mark Le Quement for useful
comments and the seminar audiences at the University of Alicante and at the European University Institute.
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10.2870/26189variable: the state of nature. This non stationarity is represented in the model as a Markov
chain. That is, the probability of being at a given state of nature tomorrow depends on which
state we are in today. To illustrate this case consider the simple situation in which a broker
has to decide whether to buy or sell a given stock. The state of nature in this case is whether
the stock goes up or down. I assume that the probability of having the stock going up is
random and depends on whether the stock went up las period or not.
Agents are given a set of alternatives where to choose from but know nothing about
the outcome of these alternatives. In particular they also ignore the fact that a Markov
chain is governing the payo of each of the available choices. Agents then learn which of
the alternatives is better by repeatedly facing the same situation. They learn from their
own payo experiences and/or from the experiences of the others. The way agents learn
is assumed to agree to the principle of reinforcement, whereby alternatives that where more
successful in the past are more likely to be chosen. Moreover, I assume that there is a memory
eect meaning that more recent payo experiences weigh more in the present decision than
less recent ones.
I study two dierent informational settings, one where after each choice, an agent knows
the payo he got and the payo he would have gotten had he chosen the other alterna-
tive (foregone payos are observed). This setting can be interpreted as if there was some
information transmission mechanism, like word-of-mouth, that makes agents aware of the
performance of all the available options. Furthermore, I also study decision making in a
another setting where after each choice each agent only knows the payo he gets from his
alternative (foregone payos are not observed).
Given these two informational settings just described, I study how the choices of a pop-
ulation evolve when agents learn according to the reinforcement principle. The results I nd
are intriguing and pose explanations to real life behavior that seemed puzzling before. In
the informational setting where foregone payos are observed I nd that the behavior of the
population converges to a behavior very similar to the probability matching behavior. Prob-
ability matching behavior is better understood with an example. Imagine a pot with 100
balls, of which 60 are red and 40 are black. Suppose that I draw 5 balls with replacement
and I ask you to guess the colors. Since at each draw there are more red balls in the urn,
the probability of getting a red ball is higher than the probability of getting a black ball.
Therefore, it is optimal to guess that the color will be red in all the 5 draws. However, in
this type of decision problem it has been observed in experiments with human subjects that
agents tend to guess red 3 times and black 2 times. Guessing red 3 out of 5 times means
guessing red 60% of the time, which is exactly the proportion of red balls that he pot contains.
Similarly, guessing black 2 out of 5 times means guessing black 40% of the time, again the
ix
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10.2870/26189fraction of black balls in the urn. The choice pattern whereby the frequency by which each
choice is made equals the frequency by which each choice is optimal is known as probability
matching.
As mentioned already, when foregone payos are observed, the behavior of the population
converges to a behavior very similar to that in probability matching. The reason being the
following: when foregone payos are observed, reinforcement is translated into being more
likely to play tomorrow the action that was best today. Hence, each action will be reinforced
a fraction of the time equal to the fraction of time that action is actually the best one. The
result follows that in the long run each action is played a fraction of time that matches the
fraction of times that action is actually the best one. As already pointed out, probability
matching is not an optimal behavior. Reinforcement behavior, although sounding a plausible
way of learning and being empirically relevant, may lead to suboptimal choices.
When foregone payos are not observed a very dierent behavior is observed. In this
case choices of the population converge to a unique alternative, as opposite to the other
informational setting, no mixing is observed. The alternative selected is the long run optimal
one only if alternatives are dierent enough. That is, if there is not a signicant dierence
in the long run payo dierence between alternatives then it is possible that the population
ends up choosing always the suboptimal choice. This suboptimal lock-on could be observed
if, for instance, the long run inferior alternative happens to be better for a long period of
time. In this case, reinforcement will lead players to play the long run inferior alternative
to the point where no one observes the performance of the other alternative. At this point,
and once the long run optimal alternative happens to be better, no one notices it under the
informational setting where foregone payos are not observed. Hence, no agent ever plays
again the alternative that is best in the long run. This behavior explains why, for instance, we
sometimes observe inferior products dominating the market as happened when the Betamax
video format took over the VHS tapes.
I round o the analysis by showing, among all the possible ways of learning following the
reinforcement principle, which ones are ecient in the sense that, when used by the agents,
they end up choosing the long run best alternative. In this respect I show that ecient
learning under reinforcement requires players to disregard the information from observing
foregone payos, in case this information is available, and exhibit very cautious learning.
Cautious learning implies that decisions are not very responsible to the feedback from the
environment. Reinforcement learning, although a learning principle employed by real life
subjects, does not use information optimally. Due to this, too much information can be
harmful. This is why I get the striking result that using less information, by disregarding
foregone payos, is the right thing to do if an agent learns according to reinforcement.
x
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10.2870/26189Chapter 3 - The Eects of the Market Structure in the Adoption of Evolving
Technologies3
In the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation I study how does the market structure aects
the speed at which new technologies are adopted. By the market structure I mean how the
market power is shared between suppliers, rms that sell new technologies, and buyers, rms
that buy new technologies.
In the model I present there is a set of rms, the suppliers, that have the rights of selling
new technologies to another set of rms, the buyers. Technologies are constantly evolving
and all suppliers have access to the same set of technologies. The role of the rms in the
supply side is then to put a price to these technologies.
The dierent market structures dier in how the market power is shared. In the rst
market structure I consider, all the market power lies in the supply side. In this setting
there is only one rm selling technologies and many rms in the demand side that compete
for buying these technologies. In the second setting I consider, the opposite happens. The
buyer holds all the market power. In this setting there are many rms selling technologies
but only one rm interested in buying a new technology. Hence, in this setting rms in the
supply side compete to selling the technology to the only rm on the demand side. The third
setting considered is characterized by the fact that both supply and demand have a share of
the market power. In this setting there is one rm on each side of the market and both rms
compete to extract as much surplus as possible.
A point worth noticing is that in this chapter I aim at understanding how the dierent
market structures can have an eect on the speed to which new technologies are adopted.
It is usually argued that dierences on speed of adoption are the result of the dierence in
the underlying evolution of the technologies themselves. That is, dierent paces of adoption
of technologies are observed because not all the technologies evolve in the same way: the
computational capacity of computers is greatly improved every year while it takes more
than 5 years to see signicant improvements in order technologies like cars. I propose an
explanation of the dierences in the timing of adoption that is based solely on the structure
of the market where the technologies are sold. Hence, we prove that dierences of speed can
be explained in term of dierent market structures and independently on the nature of the
technology at hands.
In my results I nd some striking features about the speed of adoption of new technologies.
3I would like to thank Pascal Courty, Karl Schlag, Omar Licandro and Fernando Vega-Redondo as well as
the seminar audience of the Micro Working Croup at the European University Institute for useful comments
and discussions.
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10.2870/26189First, I show that when only one side of the market holds all the power and independently of
which, the adoption of technologies is expected to occur at the same speed. That is, whether
the suppliers or the buyers hold all the market power does not aect the pace of adoption.
This is because as soon as the market power lies on only one side, the total surplus of the
economy is maximized. The only actual dierence between the two settings lies on which side
of the market actually gets to keep all this surplus. I prove that actually the total surplus
of the economy is maximized by comparing the speed of adoption when only one side of the
economy holds all the market power with the Nash bargaining solution between supply and
demand. In order words, if a social planner was to decide what is the optimal timing of
adoption, the result will be the same as if we give all the market power, or bargaining power,
to one side of the market.
When there is competition between suppliers and buyers in the sense that each side of
the market competes for the total surplus of the economy, we nd that adoption occurs at a
slower pace. This surprising result implies that competition between suppliers and buyers is
actually decreasing the total surplus of the economy as compared with the cases where only
one side of the market holds all the power. Hence, from the social point of view, competition
can be harmful in that the adoption of new technologies is delayed.
After this main result I then present some comparative statics results on how the speed
of adoption is aected in the three market settings when the parameters determining the
evolution of technologies change. I nd that the timing of adoption is more sensible to the
process determining the evolution of technologies when there is competition between supply
and demand. That is, markets where only one side holds all the power should exhibit more
similar behavior independently on the evolution of technologies than in markets where there
is competition.
Another interesting fact revealed by the numerical exercise is that as the interest rate
raises, the dierences in timing of adoption between the setting where there is competition
between supply and demand and the settings where only one side holds all the power converge
to zero. This means that in high interest rate economies the market structure has less eect
in the adoption of new technologies than in low interest rate economies.
xii
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10.2870/26189Chapter 1 - Friendship Selection
1




We model the formation of friendships as repeated cooperation within a set of heterogeneous
players. The model builds around three of the most important facts about friendship: friends
help each other, there is reciprocity in the relationship and people usually have few friends.
In our results we explain how similarity between people aects the friendship selection. We
also characterize when the friendship network does not depend on the random process by
which people meet each other. Finally, we explore how players' patience in
uences the length
of their friendship relations. Our results match and explain empirical evidence reported in
social studies on friendship. For instance, our model explains why troublesome subjects have
fewer friends.
1.1 Introduction
Social relationships represent one of the most basic needs of human beings. They arise
quickly between subjects in any kind of environment and they condition the behavior of
the subjects involved. Dierent degrees of social relationships can exist between individuals:
family members, work mates, partners, friends, etc. Among all of them, friendship relations
represent one of the most intriguing aspects of social relationships. While every person can
identify his friends if asked, it is dicult to nd a proper denition for what friendship means.
The most commonly mentioned characteristics of friendship relations are: helping, reci-
procity and a limited number of friends (See, for example, Hruschka and Henrich (2004), Silk
(2002), Hallinan (1979), de Vos and Zeggelink (1997), van de Bunt, van de Duijn and Snijders
(1999) or Zeggelink (1995)). Mutual help in a friendship relation implies that friends help
each other in case of necessity. The exchange or reciprocity means that people expect from
their friends a similar attitude to the one that they take towards them. Finally, a limited
number of friends simply means that subjects do not have as many friends as they would like
since keeping up friendship relations takes time and eort.
The present paper presents a model that tries to reproduce these three facts: helping,
reciprocity and a limited number of friends. The interactions between a group of players are
modeled in the following repeated setting: each period every player has to decide whether
to perform an activity with each of the other players in the population, one activity per
pair of people. The activity might be going to the cinema, going on vacation, doing sports
together, etc. Each player is characterized by an exogenous degree of needing help. This
means that in each of the activities each player performs, she needs some help. This might
be because she needs money, has had an accident, is sad, etc. After both players decide to
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10.2870/26189do the activity together, they have to decide simultaneously whether to help the other or
not. Helping involves a cost for the player who provides help but also a benet for the player
receiving help. In game-theoretical terms, we model the decision of helping as a cooperation
game of a class of prisoners' dilemma game. We called this game the Helping Game. The
degree to which a player needs help is exogenous, common knowledge and heterogeneous
among the players. Finally, each player is able to provide help a limited number of times
per time period. This represents the fact that helping is time-consuming. If two players are
performing the activity and helping each other (playing the cooperative equilibrium) they
are called friends. If they are performing the activity but not helping each other, they are
called mates. If they are not performing the activity they will be called strangers.
As mentioned above, our aim is to construct a model that, based on helping, reciprocity
and a limited number of friends, is able to explain some of the phenomena that we observe
in the real world friendship relations. From the preceding paragraph it is clear how we make
use of the helping and the limited number of friends. To implement reciprocity, the strategies
that we use for supporting cooperation (providing help) will be Grim Trigger. According to
Grim Trigger strategies, a player will keep on providing help to another player as long as this
other player is also providing help to her. Because Grim Trigger strategies do not allow for
forgiveness, in section 1.5.1 we check for the robustness of the results when instead players
use Tit-for-Tat for supporting cooperation.
In our three most important results we explore the three following issues: role of similarity
in friendship relations, uniqueness of equilibrium of the friendship network and length of the
friendship relations. First, we manage to explain the role of similarity in friendship relations
(similarity in the friendship context is often referred to as homophily). It has been reported
in empirical studies that similar people (same hobbies, race, etc.) are more likely to have
friendship relations. For example, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2004), using the number of
emails exchanged between students from Dartmouth College, found that similarity in age,
geographic closeness, race and interests increase the likelihood for two people to become
friends. However, strong friendship relations between very dierent people can exist. Section
1.3 suggests a solution to this fact. According to the model, when two people are mates
this means that they are having a relationship but their relationship is not strong enough to
consider them friends. We nd that similarity matters only if a \mate" relationship between
two people is possible. Otherwise, similarity will play no role in determining if these two
people can become friends and the only factor determining if a relationship is possible are
the prots from the relationship each party gets.
Second, we show that it is in general impossible to predict the friendship relations that will
prevail within a group of people in the long run. In particular we show that the equilibrium
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10.2870/26189will depend on the order in which people meet each other. This order is modeled as a
random process. In game-theoretical terms, the equilibrium is history dependent and the
history follows a random process. What is interesting about the model we present is that
we give two precise explanations for why the equilibrium may be history dependent. First,
if people belonging to the group are not dierent enough in terms of their degree of needing
help, then a certain degree of substitutability between people exists. In this case, the random
process by which people meet each other will play a role in the nal outcome of the process.
Second, if no mechanism or social norm exists by which agents punish those agents who
'betray' their friends, then the random process by which people meet each other will again
play a crucial role in determining the nal outcome. In section 1.6 we relate this and other
results with some empirical facts about friendship relations.
Many sociological, physiological and anthropological papers have modeled the process
of friendship formation. For example, in a paper by Zeggelink (1995), friends have a xed
desired number of friends and each player is dened by a dichotomous variable (they are
either type-1 player or type-2 player). Each player tries to have the desired number of friends
and to maximize the similarity in his type with the type of his friends. The author performs
simulations and nds that the players tend to group with the others of the same type. The
taste for similarity is exogenously imposed whereas we make no assumption on this respect.
In this respect, Hruschka and Henrich (2004) developed a model in which in each period
players can choose with whom they want to play a prisoners' dilemma game. The model is
focused on the evolutionary biological point of view of the cooperative relations. That is,
they focus on the dierences between the survival rates of cooperative players and selsh
players.
The model presented is dierent also from the economic models of social networks pio-
neered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) and Bala and Goyal (2000). It diers from Jackson
and Wolinsky (1995) in that in our model the payo of the players is not determined uniquely
by the state of the friendship network but also by the actions of the players against those
with whom they do not share a friendship relation. The model presented, on the other hand,
diers from Bala and Goyal (2000) in that when two players share a link, they then play a
cooperative game and not a coordination game.
To our knowledge, only two papers examine the issue of social networks when players
play a cooperative game. These are Lippert and Spagnolo (2005) and Vega-Redondo (2005).
The rst one focuses on the information transmission about the defectors in the network
and on the dierent punishment mechanism for supporting cooperation. On the other hand,
Vega-Redondo (2005) explores the amount of cooperation that will emerge in the network
when the environment suers from aggregate shocks to payos.
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10.2870/26189The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we develop the model. Section
1.3 explores the simplest case in which the population consists of only two players. Section
1.4 extends the model for more than two players. In Section 1.5 we discuss the robustness
of the results and the assumptions as well as present some extensions. We relate our results
with empirical ndings on friendship relations in Section 1.6. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Informal Discussion
Assume a population N of n players. Each player in the population is characterized by the
degree to which she needs help p 2 (0;1). Every time period t = 1;2;::: a player, say i, is
selected by nature. This player can make `phone calls' to the players with whom she intends
to form a relationship. There are two types of relationships: friends and mates. When two
players are not in a relationship, we say they are strangers. These three dierent states,
friends, mates and strangers, are explained in more detail below. When player i calls player
k, then players i and k decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively whether to enter into
such a mutual relationship or not. Relationships carry a benet to both players but also
involve the the cost of additional additional cooperation. In any relationship, each party
needs some help and the degree of help needed diers among players. Part of the relationship
is an observable decision of whether or not to cooperate in the sense of providing help. So
when two players have decided to join a mutual relationship they then non-cooperatively
simultaneously decide whether or not to help the other. When both decide to help the other
then we speak of friends; otherwise we speak of mates. If the relationship does not even arise
because at least one of the two parties does not want to participate in the relationship then
we speak of strangers.
The maximum number of times per period that a player can oer help is limited to
m 2 f1;:::;n   1g. This constraint re
ects the fact that providing help is costly in terms of
time. It implies that a player can only have at most m friends at every moment of time.
We limit the set of possible strategies of each player as follows. Only in a period in which
a player makes or receives phone calls she can change her plan of action. Otherwise, she
plays as she decided at the time of the last phone call. Only two types of plans of actions or
strategies are considered: the cooperative and the defective.
In the cooperative plan the player acts as in Grim Trigger. A friendship is suggested,
which means that, rst, a relationship is suggested and then if the other agrees the rst
player suggests helping the other when in need of help. The Grim Trigger plan also species
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10.2870/26189what to do if the other does not want to be friends or even to be mates: If a friendship does
not arise then the player chooses whatever is best for herself in the one-shot game. Depending
on the payos, this can be to not accept any relationship or to suggest forming a relationship.
Finally, the Grim Trigger plan protects against later defections by proceeding, in case of a
defection, as if a friendship did not even arise in the rst place.
In the defective strategy the player rejects or breaks the friendship relation. If both
players had a friendship relationship in the previous period then she breaks it. The player
does so by not providing help to the other player but still receiving the benets from the other
player's helping her. The two players had not previously been in a friendship relationship
with each other, she rejects a possible friendship relation and plays whatever is best for her
in the one-shot game.
1.2.2 Formal Presentation
Assume a population N of N players that discount the future at a common rate  2 (0;1).
Each player i 2 N is characterized by the degree to which she needs help pi 2 (0;1). Every
time period t = 1;2;::: every placer faces a one-shot game with every other player in the
population. In this game, which we call the Relationship Game, the two players have to
decide simultaneously whether to link l (suggest a relationship) to the other player or not
n. If both players agree on having a relationship together, they then simultaneously decide
whether to help H the other or not N. The subgame that starts after both players have
decided to join a relationship (both chose l) is called the Helping Game.
The payo scheme works as follows. First, at any given period the payo of each player is
the sum of the payo she gets from playing the Relationship Game with all the other players
in the population. Within each time the Relationship Game is played, if one of the players
decides not to link with the other, then they both get 0 payo. If both players play l but are
not helping each other, then player i gets A   pi and player k gets A   pk. Hence, they get
a xed amount A 2 (0;1) minus the degree to which they need help. If player i is helping
player k but not the other way around, then player i gets A   pi   cpk and player k gets
A   pk + xpk. That is, player i has to pay the cost cpk with c 2 (0;1) for helping player
k and player k receives a benet xpk with x 2 (0;1) because of being helped by player i.
The payos in the other situations follow the same logic. We assume A  1   x, so that
being helped without providing help is always weakly preferred to not being linked. The
Relationship Game is shown in extensive form in Figure 1.1.
For the reader's convenience, we present below the normal form of the Helping Game,
which is the subgame that starts after both players have decided to join a relationship.
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10.2870/26189Figure 1.1: Relationship Game
Table 1: Helping Game
H N
H A   (1   x)pi   cpk;A   (1   x)pk   cpi A   pi   cpk;A   (1   x)pk
N A   (1   x)pi;A   pk   cpi A   pi;A   pk
The following proposition characterizes the Nash equilibria of the Relationship Game
between players i and k. Whenever we write ((x;y);(x0;y0)), this means that player i plays
(x;y) and player k plays (x0;y0) with x;x0 2 fl;ng and y;y0 2 fH;Ng.
Proposition 1. In the Relationship Game for any players i;k 2 N:
 Nash equilibria: For each pi;pk 2 (0;1), ((n;y);(n;y0)) are Nash equilibria with y;y0 2
fH;Ng. If pi;pk  A then ((l;N);(l;N)) is also a Nash equilibrium.
 Sub-game perfect Nash equilibria: For each pi;pj 2 (0;1), ((n;N);(n;N)) is a sub-game
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10.2870/26189perfect Nash equilibrium. If pi;pk  A, then ((l;N);(l;N)) is also a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium.
As mentioned above, if two players are playing (l;H) repeatedly against each other, we
dene them as friends. If they are playing (l;N) repeatedly against each other, they are
mates. If two players play (n;N) repeatedly against each other, we say they are strangers.
The words betrays and betrayal are used throughout the paper; below we write the formal
denition of betray and betrayal.
Denition 1. We say that a player i betrays another player k if they were friends in the last
period, but in the current period i, still having a link with k, does not provide her with help.
That is, they both played (l;H) against each other in the past round but i switches to play
(l;N). We say there has been a betrayal between two players if they were friends in the last
period but at least one of them betrays the other in the current period.
As is well known from the Folk theorem in repeated games, innitely many strategies can
form Nash equilibria. Hence, we shall restrict the strategy space of the agents to make the
model tractable. In our model, as already mentioned, players are only able to have two types
of plans, the Cooperative Plan and the Defective Plan.
Cooperative Play according to Grim Trigger (dened below).
Defective Play (l;N) if you and the other player played (l;H) in the last round; play
your weakly dominant strategy in the Relationship Game otherwise.
As can be infered from the Relationship Game and Proposition 1, whenever we write play
your weakly dominant strategy it implies play (n;N) if your degree of needing help is smaller
than A; play (l;N) otherwise.
Denition 2. Dene the Grim Trigger strategy for player i 2 N played against any player
k 2 N as follows:
 If a play in any past period against k was either ((l;H);(l;N)) or ((l;N);(l;H)), then
play your weakly dominant strategy.
 Otherwise, play (l;H).
The Grim Trigger strategy prescribes helping unless there has been a betrayal in the past
between the two players. Note that by the way we dene the Grim Trigger strategy players
are protected against possible deviations from the other player when both are playing (l;H).
Our choice of these two specic plans is motivated by two facts that we explain now
and formally prove below. First, if players can play according to the Defective Plan, the
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10.2870/26189Cooperative Plan is the best (i.e. for more parameter values) way of supporting cooperation
that does not involve the use of dominated actions. Second, the Defective Plan is the best
possible deviation against the Cooperative Plan. Nevertheless, in section 1.5.1 we check for
the robustness of the results when instead of Grim Trigger players are allowed to use the
Tit-for-Tat, which allows players to forget deviations that occurred in the past.
Proposition 2. Given the possibility of playing as in the Defective Plan, there is no strat-
egy that does not involve the use of dominated actions and that can support the outcome
((l;H);(l;H)) as a part of an equilibrium of the repeated Relationship Game for a bigger set
of parameter values than the Cooperative Plan. Furthermore, the Defective Plan is the best
possible deviation against the Cooperative Plan.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
We constrain the agents to provide help at most m 2 f1;:::;n   1g times per period
and, hence, each player can have at most m friends in a given period. When each player
is to decide with whom she can set up a friendship relation, she will do so in a pair-wise
fashion. This means that, if i is to decide whether she can set up a friendship relation with
k, i will take this decision as if there were no more players in the population. That is, as if
N = fi;kg. However, i will still take into account the upper-bound m. Hence, if i already has
m friends, she will take into account that before setting up a friendship relation with k she
must break one of her already existing friendship relations. On the other hand, if i has less
than m friends, her decision of whether to set up a friendship relation with k will be taken
as if N = fi;kg. We make this assumption to make the model tractable. This assumption
can be thought as a bound in the rationality of players by which they cannot fully take into
account all the interactions that occur among all the players in the population when taking
their decisions.
We refer to a friendship relation between i and k as pair-wise sustainable if the friendship
relation is possible when N = fi;kg. Thus, Proposition 3 in the next section, where we
consider the two-player case, is telling us which friendship relations may exist in equilibrium.
Players are allowed to revise (or update) their strategies in the following way. Each period
a player, say i, is selected by nature. This player can make \phone calls" to the players with
whom she wants to play the Cooperative Plan. Player i then updates her strategies as follows.
She plays the Cooperative Plan with whom she calls and plays the Defection Plan with the
rest. The players who get a call from i can update only the plan or strategy they are playing
against i. However, if a player gets a call but is already providing help to m players, then she
can switch to play the Defective Plan against one of her friends in order to be able to play
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10.2870/26189the Cooperative Plan with the player that called her. The rest of players do not update their
strategies in any manner (for a more formal denition of the dynamics the reader is referred
to Appendix 1.A.2). The fact that only one player per period is allow to make a phone call
re
ects the fact that real-world relationships don't happen instantaneously; rather, they are
the result of a 'meeting people' process.
1.3 Two-Player Game
Assume that the population N consists of only two players, i and k.
Proposition 3. A friendship relation between players i and k can be supported in the repeated
Relationship Game when both players use Cooperative Plan if and only if the following holds:





 if pi;pk  A
1 x but either A < pi or A < pk, then A   pi + xpi   c
pk  0 and
A   pk + xpk   c
pi  0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
From Proposition 3 we conclude the following. First, if both pi and pk are smaller than
a A, then the friendship relationship can only be supported if the relative dierence between
respective probabilities of needing help is suciently small. A player with low degree of
needing help (less than A) will not accept a friendship relation with a player whose degree of
needing help, although also smaller than A, is very dierent from his.
Second, if at least one of the players needs help with a degree higher than A and both
players' need of help is below A
1 x, then players no longer care about the relative dierence
in probabilities of needing help but about their absolute values. In this case, as long as the
inequalities A   pi + xpi + c
pk  0 and A   pk + xpk + c
pi > 0 are satised, the friendship
relationship can be supported. The relevant implication of this case is that player i cares
now only about the balance between the costs and benets of the relationship instead of, as
in the previous case, being similar to the other player.
To have a better understanding of the implications of Proposition 1 we present Figure
1.2. It plots when, for a given value of the parameters A, x, c and  a friendship relation
is possible between players i and k. So if the coordinate (pi;pk) is shaded it is because for
the given parameters a player whose degree of needing help is pi can be a friend of a player
whose degree of needing help is pk and vice versa.
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10.2870/26189Figure 1.2: Friendship Relations
The common interesting feature of these graphs is the existence of non-convexity between
the area when both p's are smaller than A and the area when one of the p's is higher than
A. The intuition behind this result is that a player with a small degree of needing help will
not want to be linked with a player with a much smaller degree of needing help. This may
happen because she is afraid that this player may betray her (i.e. deviate from playing the
Cooperative Plan) since this person may prefer her only has a mate. On the other hand, if
their p's are close enough or the other player's degree of needing help is high, then he will
be willing to have the friendship relation with that other person because she knows that: (1)
she needs the other player as much as the other player needs her and since both are getting
positive prots from the relationship no one will have incentives to terminate it, and, (2) if
they are not having a relationship they will not even be mates as one of the player's degree
of needing help is higher than A. In other words, the loss if one betrays the other is too high
(they won't even be mates) in this second case.
Figure 2.4 (when c > x) merits special attention. It shows that no friendship relationship
between players with a low degree of needing help will arise. Since having a friendship
relationship is not very protable in terms of x and c, the low-degree of needing help players
will only like each other as mates and not as friends. This happens because the likelihood of
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10.2870/26189betrayal is too high. For the same reason, the relationship between low degree players and
moderate degree of needing help players will be possible. Players with a moderate degree
of needing help won't want to have mates, only friends or strangers. Therefore, in this
latter case, the cost of betrayal is very high. This makes the relationship more likely to be
supported.
Proposition 3 states that the relevance of similarity for friendship selection diers accord-
ingly to the type of players. For some pairs of players the similarity with their friends will
matter and for some other players the similarity will be irrelevant. The thing that will matter
in this latter case will be the balance between costs and benets from the relationship.
One more thing is worth underlining. A player with a very low p may be \marginalized"
among the players with low p because she needs \too little" help. Summing up the results of
Proposition 3:
 If both pi and pk are small, the relevant thing for a friendship to be possible is the
relative dierence between pi and pk.
 If either pi or pk is not small, the relevant thing for a friendship to be possible is the
absolute value of pi and pk.
1.4 n-Player Game
For a clearer understanding of the dynamics of the model when the population consists of
more than two players, we present example 1. The example is drawn in Figure 1.3, where
each node represents a player and a line between two players represents the fact that those
two players are friends.
Example 1. The simulation is conducted for N = f1;2;3g, p1 = 0:4, p2 = 0:45, p3 = 0:55
, A = 0:5, x = 0:6, c = 0:3,  = 0:7 and m = 1. In this setting all the possible friendship
relations are pair-wise sustainable. To check this we can apply the result in Proposition 3 to
the present example.
In the rst period, player 1 is selected by nature to make calls. Since m = 1, player 1 can
only provide help to at most one player. Hence, because p2 < p3, she will call player 2 and
both of them will switch to play Grim Trigger against each other.
In the second period, player 1 is again the one allowed to make calls. Since this time
she has one friend, she makes dierent considerations. Because of the fact that m = 1, she
now wonders if betraying 2 and setting up a relationship with 3 is better than keeping the
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10.2870/26189friendship relation with 2. Betraying player 2 is protable for player 1 because providing help
is costly. Hence, it may happen that the lower payo associated with a friendship relation
with player 3 is compensated by the one-period gains from betraying player 2. This is exactly
the case in this particular example. Therefore, player 1 will call player 3 and they will switch
to play Grim Trigger against each other. Moreover, player 1 will play (l;N) against player
2.
In period 3, nature selects player 2. Since player 1 betrayed player 2, the friendship
relation between them is no longer possible. This is due to the unforgivingness property of the
Grim Trigger strategy. Hence, player 2 will call player 3. Player 3 is in a similar situation
to the one faced by player 1 in the second period. In this particular example, player 3, as did
player 1, nds the betrayal protable. Hence, player 3 betrays player 1 to set up a friendship
relation with player 2.
An equilibrium has been reached. Since player 1 betrayed player 2 and player 3 betrayed
player 1, no new friendship relations can arise in the network.
As we have seen, nature (or chance) plays an important role in determining which friend-
ship relations can arise. If the players selected by nature were 2, 2 and 3 in this order, the
equilibrium would have had players 1 and 3 as the only friends. This result together with
other important ones is presented in the next subsection.
In the example above, the equilibrium in which players 2 and 3 are friends results only
if 1 betrayed 2 (or vice versa) and 3 betrayed 1 (or vice versa). On the other hand, the
equilibrium in which 1 and 3 are friends is possible only if 1 betrayed 2 (or vice versa) and 2
betrayed 3 (or vice versa). Therefore, the equilibrium in this case is history dependent.
The key to this result is that, if players 2 and 3 from the example above are similar
enough, player 1 is not losing much by having a relationship with player 3 instead of with
player 2. What loss there is can be compensated by the one-shot prots from betraying 2
today. Hence, the existence of a certain degree of substitutability between friends creates
history dependence in the equilibria. This fact is exploited in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 shows that convergence to equilibrium is always guaranteed, although the
equilibrium can depend on the order in which players are selected by nature. This fact
represents an important feature of friendship relations. The friendship relations that emerge
in the real world are the result of a complex process of interactions between individuals in
which unpredictable events may play a crucial role in the nal outcome. The order of meeting
people has important eects on one's long-term relationships. However, as we shall see below,
there are some situations in which the convergence of the process to a uniquely determined
equilibrium is guaranteed. These situations are: 1) when the players in the population are
13




dierent enough from each other (Proposition 5), and, 2) when there exists some type of
social rule by which betrayers are punished (Proposition 9).
Proposition 4. The system converges with probability 1 to an equilibrium network archi-
tecture that can be history dependent. If A > c then there exists an " > 0 such that
if mini;k2N;i6=k jpi   pkj > ", then the friendship network converges with probability 1 to a
unique network architecture.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
Therefore, when players in the population are dierent enough, the process will converge to
a unique equilibrium. In other words, the process has only one equilibrium that is not history
dependent and the process will always converge to it. As mentioned before, there exists a
certain degree of substitutability between friends. Hence, if players are dierent enough, no
player will want to betray a friend to set up a relationship with a higher-degree-of-needing-
help player. Once the substitutability between friends is eliminated, we can successfully
predict the long-term friendship relations that will arise within the population. Note that
conditions in Proposition 4 do not rule out the case where players with p < A can have
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that the friendship network converges to a unique equilibrium, similarity may play a role.
Another interesting feature of the model is that, when subjects are more patient, the
duration of the friendship relations will tend to be longer. When a player is about to betray
another one, she has to consider the fact that the betrayal will yield her a higher current
payo but possibly a lower future payo (consider, for instance, the rst betrayal in the case
above). Hence, more patient subjects are less likely to betray another player to set up a
friendship relation with a player who has a higher degree of needing help. Note that the
decision of a player to betray one of her friends and to set up a friendship relation with a
player who has a lower degree of needing help is independent of . This is formally stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Ceteris paribus, the length of the friendship relations depends positively on
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
Now we present some more complex examples to get a better understanding of how the
friendship network looks in equilibrium. Simulations are conducted for the same parameter
values as in example 1. That is, A = 0:5, x = 0:6, c = 0:3,  = 0:7. We run simulations
for two dierent population sizes, 12 and 19, and for two possible values for the maximum
number of friends a player can have, m = 2 and m = 4.
Figure 1.4 show the result of the simulation for m = 2 (left-hand side) and m = 4
(right-hand side). The degrees to which each player needs help are given by pi = 0:05i with
i 2 f1;:::;8g and pi = 0:55 + 0:05i for i 2 f9;:::;12g. As we can see, when m = 2 two
groups (components) are formed. These two components are not fully connected and exhibit
the circle property. This is because each player is restricted to having at most two friends.
However, if we allow them to have more than two friends, the two components merge and
there is a slight increase in connectivity. Careful inspection of the graph at the right-hand
side shows that we have two interconnected components, one with players 6;7;8 and 12 and
the other one with the rest.
In Figure 1.5 we show a for the case where there are 19 players in the population and the
degrees to which each player needs help are given by pi = 0:05i for f1;:::;19g. When m = 2,
we can see that there are three components plus four players that have no friendship relations
at all. Again, once we allow the population to have more than 2 friends (right-hand side) the
two components merge and we are left with a single component plus three players that are
isolated. In the right-hand side graph, we can see the important role played by player 5, who
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is linked to two subcomponents, the one that involves players 6;7;8;9 and 16 and the other
that involves all the players except herself and players 15;17 and 18.
Figure 1.5: Simulation - 19 players
From Figures 1.4 and 1.5 we can see that, as one would expect from real-life friendship
relations, the friendship networks arising in equilibrium are very complex and few or non
generalities can be found. Apart from the qualitative results already presented, we have
been unable to nd any other generalization. Furthermore, for every seemingly general fact
involving the existence of stars, components, circles, etc. and for every observation about the
amount of connectivity, the characteristic of isolated players, the distance between players,
etc. we were able to nd an example such that, with a slight modication of the parameters,
the fact or observation was no longer present..
16





In this section we check for the robustness of our results when players, instead of using Grim
Trigger, use the Tit-for-Tat. Because of our way of modeling, we cannot use the standard
denition of Tit-for-Tat. The problem arises due to the possibility of not being linked so we
have to adapt the standard denition to our setting. We dene Tit-for-Tat as follows. If
player k betrays player i, player i will oer help to the other player again only if k oers
help to i and at the same time i does not help k. Hence, after a betrayal, the friendship
relation can be reestablished only if the betrayer 'pays back' to the betrayed for the harm
done. Formally,
Denition 3. Dene the Tit-for-Tat strategy for player i 2 N played against any player
k 2 N as follows:
 If i never betrayed k and k never betrayed i, play (l;H).
 Otherwise:
1. If the play in the past period against k was ((l;N);(l;H)) or ((l;H);(l;H)) then
play (l;H).
2. If the play in the past period against k was ((n;fH;Ng);(l;H)) then play (l;N).
3. Otherwise, play your weakly dominant strategy.
The following result shows that the conditions for supporting friendship under Grim
Trigger (Proposition 1) and Tit-for-Tat are the same apart from minor dierences.
Proposition 6. Under Tit-for-Tat strategies, a friendship relation between players i and k
can be supported in the repeated game if and only if the following holds:
 if pj  A




 if pj  A
1 x and A < p j  A
1 x, then 1
1+(A   pj) + xpj   c
p j  0
for j 2 fi;kg and  j 2 fi;kg r fjg.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
When both pi and pk are below A both Grim Trigger and Tit-for-Tat strategies yield the
same conditions for supporting friendship. When either pi > A or pk > A, the condition is
17




slightly dierent between the two settings. Figure 1.6 is a counterpart of Figure 1.2 for the
case of Tit-for-Tat strategies formulation.
Under Tit-for-Tat strategy convergence to equilibrium is not guaranteed, that is, the
friendship network may cycle between dierent congurations forever. The reason why this
happens is that, because of the discount factor, it may be in some players' interest to contin-
uously betray each other and became friends again. In Figure 5 we present an example of a
situation in which the social network never reaches an equilibrium. The parameters used are
the same as in example 1. Computations are presented in Appendix 1.A.4.
Remark 1. Under Tit-for-Tat strategies, convergence to an equilibrium is not guaranteed.
1.5.2 Social Punishment
Now we analyze a dierent issue. In the model presented in the main text, if a player betrays
another, the rest of the players in the population do not react to the betrayal. We may
think that if an agent is betraying her friends, it is less likely that new agents will want to
set up a friendship relation with her. We explore a situation in which, if a player betrays
another, all players will automatically switch to play (n;N) against the betrayer. Each player
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knows this fact when considering whether to betray one of her friends or not. We call this
punishment mechanism the Social Punishment. This punishment mechanism may seem to
be a bit too strong but we do not study here the eects of dierent punishment mechanisms
(Kandori (1992) undertakes this issue). Here we restrict ourselves to the most basic and
simple mechanism of social punishment.
In addition to this, we add one further plan to the two plans players already have at
their disposal. The Friendly Ending Plan is now available for the players. By friendly ending
we mean that the player who wants to break the friendship relation switches to play (n;N)
instead of betraying the other player by playing (l;N).
Friendly Ending Play (n;N) if you and the other player played (l;H) in the last round;
play your weakly dominant strategy in the Relationship Game otherwise.
Proposition 7. Assume Social Punishment. For all A, x, c there exists a ^  > 0 such that
if  > ^  and pi 6= pj 8i;j 2 N, then the friendship network converges with probability 1 to a
unique network architecture.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
Without the Social Punishment, we only need each player to be dierent enough ensure
convergence to a unique equilibrium. On the other hand, with Social Punishment, we need
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The following result for the case of Social Punishment deserves attention. Dene a fully
connected component as the set of players who are all friends with each other and with no
player outside the component.
Proposition 8. Consider an equilibrium situation. If pi 6= pj 8i;j 2 N,  >   and Social
Punishment exists, then there exists no fully connected component of m + 1 or more players
in which all of the players have a degree of needing help bigger than A.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
Proposition 8 implies that players with a high degree of needing help can not form big
groups of friendship. Without Social Punishment a betrayal in an early period between
people with high degree of needing help may make possible the existence in equilibrium of a
component of more than m + 1 players to exist in equilibrium.
1.6 Relating our Results with Some Empirical Facts About
Friendship
We propose a repeated setting in which players are friends when they are helping each other.
Many empirical studies show how important the exchange of help between friends is. For
example, Walker (1995) interviewed 52 working- and middle-class subjects and found that one
of the main functions of the friends was to provide help. She found that among the working-
class this help was based on providing goods and services such as borrowing or lending small
amounts of money or helping in nding a job. In turn, helping among the middle-class was
based on emotional and intellectual support.
In their study on 185 Dutch students, Buunk and Prins (1998) found that in the relation-
ship with their best friend, 73.6% of the subjects considered the friendship to be reciprocal.
In our paper, players' reciprocity is translated into Grim Trigger: I help you as long as you
help me. The Cooperative Plan is restrictive as it does not allow for forgiveness, which is a
standard feature of friendship. We believe that using Grim Trigger is not so far from reality
as betraying a friend is something very severe that is dicult to forgive. Betraying a friend
causes direct and conscious harm, which is dierent to, for instance, having a small argument
with a friend. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, section 1.5.1 presents the results for the
case in which players instead use the Tit-for-Tat strategy, which allows for forgiveness.
According to Proposition 4, the friendship equilibrium can depend on the order in which
players are selected by nature. We can think of the order in which players are selected by
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player selected by nature is the one who can have the initiative to meet new people by making
phone calls. The fact that the order in which people meet each other aects the long-term
friendship relations was reported in an empirical study by Cloninger (1986). Cloninger found
that meeting new people may result in breaking old and strong friendship relations because
of the novelty of having new friends. In a forthcoming article, Whitmeyer and Yeingst (2008)
refer to this characteristic of the friendship relations as ckleness.
Our result in Proposition 5 related the length of the friendship relations in a population
to the patience of players, represented by the discount factor. In a sample with children from
the fourth and sixth grades, Hallinan (1978) found that the length of the friendship relations
was considerably longer among the sixth-grade children than among fourth grade children.
Hence, considering that the discount factor decreases with age (see, for example, Read and
Read (2004)), the result stated in the proposition matches the empirical result concerning
friendship relations between children.
1.7 Conclusions
We have presented a model of friendship selection between a group of players. Each player
can decide with whom of the other players in the group she wants to set up a friendship
relation. The results of the paper state under which conditions friendship can arise between
players. We nd that when there are only two players, the decision to be friends between
players whose degree of needing help is low depends on the relative dierence between their
degrees of needing help: the bigger the dierence, the less likely they are to become friends.
For players whose degree of needing help is high, we nd that rather than caring about the
relative dierence in degrees of needing help, they look only at the absolute level of these
values
When we move to analyze the case of a group of more than two people, we nd that it is
in general impossible to predict which friendship relations will be present in equilibrium. We
present two explanations for why this happens. These are the existence of a certain degree of
substitutability between friends and the non-existence of a social mechanism to punish the
players betraying friends. We also nd that the length of the friendship relations positively
depends on the patience of the players.
The model presented here diers mainly from the existing models in psychology, anthro-
pology and sociology in that it is solved analytically and in the fact no assumptions in the
taste for friends are made. Moreover, it diers from the existing models of social networks in
that: there exists heterogeneity between players, the cooperation game that players play in
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dierent in each one of the cooperative games that they play on each period.
The results found in the paper seem to match the ndings reported in many empirical
studies of friendship selection. In our opinion, the value of the paper lies in the fact that it
gives a precise non-trivial explanation to some of the phenomena we nd in the friendship
relations among humans. Possible extensions of the model may include a more general setting
in which the degrees of needing help are unknown but players can learn them or allowing for
a more 
exible dynamic setting with respect to how players change their strategies.
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Appendix
1.A.1 Proofs
Proposition 2. Given the possibility of playing as in the Defective Plan, there is no strat-
egy that does not involve the use of dominated actions and that can support the outcome
((l;H);(l;H)) as a part of an equilibrium of the repeated Relationship Game for a bigger set
of parameter values than the Cooperative Plan. Furthermore, the Defective Plan is the best
possible deviation against the Cooperative Plan.
Proof. First, we prove the rst part of the proposition. It is straightforward to notice that,
given the possibility of playing the Defective Plan the only way of making the cooperative
outcome easier to sustain, in the sense that it can be sustained for a bigger set of parameter
values, is via the following strategy.
 If a play in any past period against k was either ((l;H);(l;N)) or ((l;N);(l;H)), then
play (n;N).
 Otherwise, play (l;H).
That is, a strategy that threatens the opponent with playing (n;N) if a deviation occurs
increases the parameter set for which a friendship relation is possible. Any other strategy
dierent from the one above will imply less cooperation as the Defective Plan will make
deviation protable for a bigger parameter set. However, playing (n;N) is weakly dominated
by playing (l;N) for all players i 2 N with pi  A, a contradiction.
The second part of the proposition follows easily. The best one-period gain can be achieved
by playing (l;N) when the other player is playing (l;H), which is what the Defective Plan
prescribes. Moreover, once deviation has occurred, the Cooperative Plan prescribes playing
the weakly dominant action in the Relationship Game, and the best response to this is to
also play the weakly dominant action in the Relationship Game, which is again what the
Defective Plan prescribes.
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Relationship Game when both players use Cooperative Plan if and only if the following holds:





 if pi;pk  A
1 x but either A < pi or A < pk, then A   pi + xpi   c
pk  0 and
A   pk + xpk   c
pi  0.
Proof. The payo to player i when both players play (l;H) equals 1
1 (A   pi + xpi   cpk).
If player i deviates at time t from this strategy, then according to the denition of the
Cooperative Plan, three things can happen:
Case 1. If pi  A and pk  A then the most protable deviation for player i is to play (l;N).
This is weakly better for her than to play (n;N) if pi  A. According to the Cooperative Plan,
in the period after this deviation occurs, player k would switch to play (l;N) forever because
pk < A. Then, the payo of the deviation for player i equals (A   pi   xpi) + 
1 (A   pi).







Case 2. If pi  A
1 x but A < pk, then A   pk < 0 and A   pi > 0. In this case the best
deviation for player i is to play (l;N) as shown before. But this time, however, because pk > A
player k will switch to play (n;N) forever after player i's deviation occurs. The payo of
deviation from (l;H) for player i is given by A   pi   xpi. Hence, the increase of payo for
player i from the deviation is weakly negative if and only if:
A   pi + xpi  
c

pk  0: (1.2)
Case 3. If A
1 x  pi > A, then the best deviation for player i is to play (l;N) if the other
player is playing (l;H) and to play (n;N) if the other player is not playing (l;H). So if
they are both playing the Cooperative Plan and no deviation has occurred, if i deviates from
(l;H), the action she will play is (l;N) (because A pi +xpi  0). The next period after the
deviation the action played is (n;N). Hence, i's payo is the same as in the previous case,
so his incentives to deviate are the same as in the previous case. Therefore, equation (1.2)
gives us the condition for player i to support the Friendship Equilibrium.
Grouping the results of cases 1, 2 and 3 and their equivalent for player k gives us the
result stated in the proposition.
Proposition 4. The system converges with probability 1 to an equilibrium network archi-
tecture that can be history dependent. If A > c then there exists a " > 0 such that if
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network architecture.
Proof. First, we prove the rst statement of the theorem. The fact that the equilibrium
network architecture may be history dependent was already shown in example 1. Moreover,
the system will always converge to an equilibrium because of the following. Given that players
are using Grim Trigger as the strategy for supporting cooperation, if one player betrayed one
of her friends then they won't become friends ever again. Hence, the process will eventually
get to a point in which no player will want to betray her friends nor to change the strategy
she is currently playing against the other players. Once this happens, the process has reached
an equilibrium.
To prove the second statement of the theorem we proceed as follows. As mentioned earlier,
the process is not ergodic because of the substitutability between players. That is, given the
order in which players are selected by nature, it may happen that a player betrays one of her
friends to set up a friendship relation with a third one whose degree of needing help is higher.
As we show in the next paragraph, this will never happen if players are dierent enough.
If players are dierent enough, then the unique equilibrium can be constructed in a fashion
that we will specify below.
The increase in the prot for player i from betraying a friend, say player k, for setting up
a friendship relation with another player j with pk < pj is at most c

pk   




1 (A   xpi + pi). Hence, if c(pk   pj) + A   (1   x)pi) < 0 for all i;j;k 2 N, that is,
if  c + A < 0 and pj and pk are dierent enough, then the prots from betraying will
be negative and the only betrayal that will occur will be those in which one player betrays
another for setting up a friendship relation with a third one that has a smaller degree of
needing help.
To construct the equilibrium network when players are dierent enough we proceed as
follows. Take the player with the lowest degree of needing help in the population, say i. Dene
the combination of relationships between i and the rest of the players that maximize i's payo
for a given m. This combination of friendship relations, call it fi, is uniquely determined if
all the players are dierent from each other. Now take the player that has the second lowest
degree of needing help in the group, say k. Dene the combination of relationships between
k and the rest of the players that maximize k's payo for a given m and considering that the
friendship relation prescribed by fi has to hold. Continue in this fashion until the player with
the highest degree of needing help. This results in a friendship network F = f1[f2[[fN.
It is clear that if players are dierent enough F is an equilibrium network as no player
can improve her situation by betraying a friend in order to set up a friendship relation with
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in any network conguration dierent to F, there exists at least one player that can improve
her situation by changing her current strategy. To see this, consider a network conguration
dierent to F. Take the player with the lowest degree of needing help that has her friendship
relations dierent that what F prescribes. If she breaks her links and oers links to the
players with whom she should be linked according to F, these links will be accepted and she
will improve her payo (by construction of the network F).
Now we show that the process converges with probability one to network F. To do so we
only have to consider the fact that (1) for any network dierent from F there is a positive
probability from moving to a dierent network, (2) once the network F is reached, the process
remains there forever, and (3), for any network there is a positive probability of reaching the
network conguration F in a nite number of steps. Statements (1) and (2) were proven in
the preceding paragraphs (by showing that F is the unique equilibrium network). To show
(3) it is enough to notice that at any point in time there is a positive probability that the
players allowed to revise their strategy in each period are ordered from the one with the
lowest degree of needing help to the one with the highest degree of needing help. However, if
this is the case, the network that the process reaches is exactly F, as we wanted to show.
Proposition 5. Ceteris paribus, the length of the friendship relations depends positively on
.
Proof. For any friendship relation between two players, the chances that one of the players
will betray the other negatively depends on the discount factor. This is so because when a
player betrays another player, she is increasing her present payo for a possible decrease of
her future payo. Hence, the higher the discount factor, the less likely a player will betray
one of her friends. Therefore, given a set of parameters and a population, the speed at which
the friendship relations change depends negatively on the discount factor.
Proposition 6. Under Tit-for-Tat strategies, a friendship relation between players i and k
can be supported in the repeated game if and only if the following holds:
 if pj  A




 if pj  A
1 x and A < p j  A
1 x, then 1
1+(A   pj) + xpj   c
p j  0
for j 2 fi;kg and  j 2 fi;kg r fjg.
Proof. We structure the proof of this result similarly to the proof of Proposition 1 but with
the only dierence that once a player betrays the other, it may be in her interest to play (l;H)
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i that the situation in which both players play (l;H) forever equals 1
1 (A   pi + xpi   cpk).
If player i deviates at time t from this strategy, according to the denition of the Tit-for-Tat
strategy two things can happen:
Case 1. If pi  A
1 x and pk  A, then the best deviation for player i is to play (l;N). In
the period after this deviation occurred, player k will switch to play (l;N) because pk  A. If
player i then plays (l;N) or (n;N) forever, we are in the same case as Grim Trigger, i.e. the
case in which condition 1.1 has to hold. On the other hand, if player i plays (l;H) from after
the period she deviated on, player k will also come back to playing (l;H). Note that for player
i there is no dierence between trying to restore the friendship relationship immediately after
he betrayed player k T periods after the betrayal has taken place. The payo of the deviation
for player i equals (A   pi + xpi) + (A   pi   cpk) + 2
1 (A   pi   xpi   cpk). Hence, the







Note that in this case the condition for friendship to be possible is the same as in the case
with Grim Trigger.
Case 2. If pi  A
1 x but A < pk, then A   pk < 0 and A   pi > 0. In this case the best
deviation for player i is to play (l;N) as shown before. But this time, however, because
pk > A player k will switch to play (n;N) after player i's deviation occurs. If player i then
plays (l;N) forever, we are in the same case as Grim Trigger, i.e. the case in which the
condition 1.2 has to hold. On the other hand, imagine that player i plays (l;H) from after
the period she deviated on. Then, according to the Tit-for-Tat strategy, player k will play
rst (l;N) and then (l;H) forever. The payo of deviation from (l;H) for player i is given
by A pi +xpi + 2
1  (A   pi   cpk)+ 3
1  (A   pi + xpi   cpk). Hence, the increase of payo
for player i from the deviation is weakly negative if and only if:
1
1 + 
(A   pi) + xpi  
c

pk > 0 (1.4)
Note that condition 1.4 is stronger than condition 1.2.
Grouping the results of cases 1, 2 and 3 and their equivalent for player k gives us the
result stated in the proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume Social Punishment. For all A, x, c there exists a ^  > 0 such that
if  > ^  and pi 6= pj 8i;j 2 N, then the friendship network converges with probability 1 to a
unique network architecture.
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knows that from the moment of her betrayal she will get a payo of 0 forever. Hence, when
deciding whether to betray or not, the player takes into account the present period increase
in her prots with the future decrease in her payo. Hence, if player i is patient enough she
won't be interested in betraying any of her friends ever. This result, combined with the fact
that all players are dierent, shows that, using the same arguments as in Proposition 4, a
unique network exists and the system converges to it with certainty.
Proposition 8. Consider an equilibrium situation. If  is high enough, pi 6= pj 8i;j 2 N
and there exists Social Punishment, then there exists no component of m+1 or more players
in which all of the players have degree of needing help bigger than A.
Proof. The proof goes by contradiction. Take a group of k > m + 1 players among which all
have their degree of needing help bigger than A. Take the m + 1 players of the component
with the lowest degree of needing help. Because k > m + 1, at least one of them won't be
linked with the other m (if not these m + 1 players will form a closed component which by
assumption is not the case). Take a player among the m+1 with the lowest degree of needing
help in the component who is not linked with the other m with the lowest degree of needing
help in the component. If she makes calls to the players with whom she is not linked and have
the lowest degree of needing help in the component, the calls will result in new friendships.
Note that this won't happen if some players have a degree of needing help smaller than A.
Hence, the initial situation was not an equilibrium.
1.A.2 Dynamics
The dynamics of the model work as follows.
1. At t = 0 each player is playing the strategy "play (n;N) against all players in all the
rounds".
2. In period t for t = 1;2;::: the following sequence of events takes place:
(a) A player i 2 N is selected by nature. This player can make calls to the other
players.
(b) Every player k 2 N i plays, if she gets a call from i, according to one of the
possible schemes:
i. If cooperation between k and i is not pair-wisely sustainable. Then k plays the
same strategy she played last period against all the players in the population.
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viding help less than m times. Then player k plays Grim Trigger with i and
plays the same strategy she played last period against the rest of the players.
iii. If cooperation between k and i is pair-wisely sustainable and k is providing
help exactly m times. Let j be the player with the highest degree of needing
help among those who k is currently helping. If, moreover, the discounted
present value of the prots from playing the Cooperative strategy with i plus
playing the Defective strategy j are higher than the prots of player k from
playing the Cooperative strategy against j, then player k switches to play
the Cooperative strategy with i, the Defective strategy with j and plays the
same strategy she played last period against the rest of players. Otherwise, k
plays the same strategy she played last period against all the players in the
population.
(c) Player i, the one selected by nature in the current period, makes calls to the other
players and changes her current strategy against them. She does so knowing that
the players who get a call will react as stated in step b. She makes the calls
and changes her strategy in such a way as to maximize her present value payo
myopically, i.e.
i. she will decide whom to call and play the Cooperative strategy with
ii. she will play the Defective strategy with the players she does not call.
(d) Players who get a call from i play according to step b.
(e) All other players don't change strategy.
1.A.3 Example: A Simple Case
The simulation in example 1 is conducted for N = f1;2;3g, p1 = 0:4, p2 = 0:45, p3 = 0:55
, A = 0:5, x = 0:6, c = 0:3,  = 0:7 and m = 1. First we check that all friendship relations
are possible. To do so we only have to apply Proposition 3 to the present example. Players 1
and 2 can be friends because 0:3
0:60:7  0:4
0:45  0:60:7
0:3 . Players 1 and 3 can be friends because
0:5 0:4+0:60:4  0:3
0:7 0:55 = 0:104  0 and 0:5 0:55+0:60:55  0:3
0:7 0:4 = 0:108  0.
Finally, players 2 and 3 can be friends because 0:5 0:45+0:60:45  0:3
0:7 0:55 = 0:084  0
and 0:5   0:55 + 0:6  0:55   0:3
0:7  0:45 = 0:087  0.
In period 1, player 1 is selected by nature. Since she can set up friendship relations
with the other two players but she is constrained to have at most one friendship relation
player 1 will choose to call player 2. This is true simply because p2 < p3 and hence, the
stream of payos for player 1 is higher if she sets up a friendship relation with player 2.
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1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:4 + 0:6  0:4   0:3  0:45) = 0:683. On the other hand, if player 1 sets up a
friendship relation with player 3, her stream of payos equals 1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:4 + 0:6  0:4   0:3
0:55) = 0:583. Player 2 will respond to the call of player 1 by switching to play Grim Trigger




In period 2, player 1 is again selected by nature. Now her decision is whether or not to
betray player 2. In this example, player 1 will switch to the strategy "play (l;N) if you and
the other player played (l;H) in the last round; play your weakly dominant strategy in the
Relationship Game otherwise" against player 2 and will call player 3 and play Grim Trigger
against her. That is, player 1 will betray player 2. The next period after this deviation
occurs, both player 1 and player 2 will switch to play (l;N) against each other (because
p1 < p2 < A). To see that player 1 will betray player 2 and call player 3 and play Grim
Trigger against her, we consider her payo with this change of her strategies. If player 1
betrays player 3 and sets up a relationship with player 3, her payo equals (0:5   0:4 +
0:60:4)+ 0:7
1 0:7 (0:5   0:4)+ 1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:4 + 0:6  0:4   0:3  0:55) = 1:156. On the other
hand, if player 1 keeps her friendship relation with player 2, she will get a payo equal to:
1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:4 + 0:6  0:4   0:3  0:45) = 0:683. Hence, player 1 will betray player 2 and
set up a friendship relation with player 3.
In period 3, player 2 is selected by nature. She will call player 3 instead of player 1
because the betrayal that happened in period 2 now makes the friendship between player
1 and 2 impossible forever. In this example, we have that, in response to player 2's call,
player 3 will betray player 1 to set up a relationship with player 2 even though the prot
of player 3 is higher if she has a friendship relation with player 1. The stream of payos of
player 3 from betraying player 1 by setting up a relationship with player 2 equals: (0:5  
0:55 + 0:6  0:55) + 1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:55 + 0:6  0:55   0:3  0:45) = 0:763. On the other hand,
the stream of payos of player 3 if she keeps her friendship relation with player 1 equals:
1
1 0:7 (0:5   0:55 + 0:6  0:55   0:3  0:4) = 0:533. Hence, player 3 will betray player 1.
After period 3, the network is in equilibrium. No player can increase her prot by changing
the strategy as it can be easily veried.
1.A.4 Example: Nonexistence of Equilibrium under Tit-for-Tat
We now show with an example that under Tit-for-tat there may not exist equilibrium. We use
the same set of parameters as in example 1. That is, N = f1;2;3g;p1 = 0:4;p2 = 0:45;p3 =
0:55;A = 0:5;x = 0:6;c = 0:3; = 0:7 and m = 1.
First, we check that a friendship relation is possible between any two players in the group.
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we applied Proposition 3 in Appendix 1.A.3.
We show now that, in this particular case, the process will never converge no matter how
nature selects the players. As we showed in the proceeding paragraph, all friendship relations
are possible. Now we show that for any given friendship relation in this group, there is always
a protable betrayal independent of the history of past play. Imagine that players 1 and 2 are
friends and both players betrayed player 3 recently. If one of these two players wants to set up
a friendship relation with player 3, they will have to rst 'pay back' and oer help to player 3.
Imagine that player 2 is selected by nature: she will betray player 1 and switch to play (l;H)




1 0:7 (0:5   0:45 + 0:6  0:45   0:3  0:4).
This inequality holds true. Note that because p1 < p2 and p3 < A, if player 2 nds it protable
to retake her friendship with player 3 so will player 1 . Also note that if player 1 (2) nds
it protable to betray 2 (1) to retake her friendship relation with 3, it is straightforward to
show that since p3 > p2 > p1, if player 1 (2) is having a friendship relation with 3, she will
nd it protable to betray player 3 and to retake (or start) a friendship relation with 2 (1).
Also, in this example player 3 nds it protable to betray player 1 (2) to retake her friendship
relation with player 2 (1). However, this is not needed for the result we want to show.
So we have that for any history of past play (or, more intuitively, history of past betrayals),
there always exists at least one player that can increase her prot by changing strategy. Hence,
the process never converges to an equilibrium.
1.A.5 Formal Denitions of the Sets of Strategies
Let i and k stand for the two typical elements of N and let N i = N r fig. Dene the set
of actions in the Relationship Game as A = fl;ng  fH;Ng and let Ai be the set of actions
of each player i against every other player in the Relationship Game, Ai = (Aij)j inN i with
Aij 2 A. Let Ht
ik be the set of all possible histories between players i and k till the beginning







ik for t  1 and H0
ik = ? with
hs
ik 2 fAik  Akig for s 2 f1;:::;t   1g. Dene Ht
i = (Ht
ij)j2N i.
Let Lt be the sequence of players selected by nature till time t, hence Lt = (l)t
=1 with
l 2 N. Dene the set of strategies of each player i against player k given the players selected
by nature each period and set of all possible histories between i and all the other players as
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combinations of players selected by nature into the set of actions. We make use of pair-wise
strategies. That is, if player i is to decide which action to take against player k, i will only
consider the past history between i and k as if N = fi;kg. Formally, denote the pair-wise set
of strategies for each player i against player k given the players selected by nature in every
period and set of all possible histories between players i and k by 
p















We are using the superscript p to refer to the fact that the strategy is pair-wise. For each i










We write ik(i; i) as the discounted present value payo for player i when he plays the
Relationship game against player k when i's strategy is i and the rest of players are playing

















i 2 (l;H)g  m
Put in words, each player maximizes her payo taking each relationship pair-wisely subject
to the constraint of not oering help more than m times.
Finally, we reduce the strategy space to the case in which, for each player i, her strategy
against every player k consists in either the Cooperative strategy or the Defective strategy.
For every i;k let ^ 
p
i be this strategy space.
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Markovian Environment
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We investigate learning in a setting where each period a population has to choose between
two actions and the payo of each action is unknown by the players. The population learns
according to reinforcement and the environment is non-stationary, meaning that there is
correlation between the payo of each action today and the payo of each action in the
past. We show that when players observe realized and foregone payos, a suboptimal mixed
strategy is selected. On the other hand, when players only observe realized payos, a unique
action, which is optimal if actions perform dierent enough, is selected in the long run. When
looking for ecient reinforcement learning rules, we nd that it is optimal to disregard the
information from foregone payos and to learn as if only realized payos were observed.
2.1 Introduction
Imagine the simple decision problem in which every period individuals in a population have
to choose between two alternatives. The payo of these two alternatives is not know by the
players. What is more, the payo of the alternatives could vary over time according to some
distribution also unknown for the players.
This decision problem is faced by many of us in our everyday lives: whether to buy a PC
or a Mac, whether to have fruit or a cake as a dessert in a restaurant, or whether to watch an
action movie or a romantic movie at the theater. Although oblivious of the payo we will get
from making these choices, we might have some information that can help in choosing the
better alternative. This information could have been obtained, for instance, from our own
experiences in the past or via word-of-mouth communication.
In this paper we study how the choices made by a population evolve in the setting just
described. The model we present has two major features about how players learn and about
how the payos change. First, players learn according to reinforcement, whereby actions that
where successful in the past are more likely to be chosen. Second, the underlying distribution
determining the payo of each action is non-stationary. This means that the payo today of
a given action depends on the payo it yielded in the past. In particular, we consider the
case in which payos depend deterministically on the state of nature. The state of nature
changes following a Markov chain. Hence, the probability of being at a given state tomorrow
depends on which state we are in today. Players are ignorant of this fact; they simply observe
that the payo of available actions changes over time.
In the learning literature, as well as in the economic literature in general, randomness
determining the outcome of certain events or actions is almost always assumed to follow a
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as real life phenomena, such as nancial markets, gambling, population biology, statistical
mechanics, etc., quite often follow non-stationary processes. To our knowledge, only Ben-
Porath et al. (1993) and Rustichini (1999) deal with the evolutionary properties of models
where nature follows a non-stationary process.
Ben-Porath et al. (1993) present an evolutionary model that is framed within a changing
environment. They study two types of environments: one in which the change is deterministic
and another in which the changes in environment follow a Markov chain. In their model,
players' actions are subject to random mutations. They characterize the mutation rate that
maximizes population growth in the long run.
Rustichini (1999) presents a paper that focuses on the optimality of two dierent pop-
ulation dynamics within a Markovian environment. In his model, the environment changes
according to a Markov chain, and for any state in the chain there is a unique action that
maximizes payo. Rustichini (1999) studies the optimality properties of linear and exponen-
tial (logit) adjustment process when players have innite memory. An adjustment process or
learning rule is simply a map between information and strategies. Rustichini (1999) considers
two dierent informational settings about payos of actions. In one of these settings players
observe the performance of all the actions (realized and foregone payos are observed), while
in the other they only observe the performance of the action chosen (only realized payos are
observed).
As in Rustichini (1999), we consider two informational settings: one in which both realized
and foregone payos are observed and another in which only realized payos are observed.
There are two main dierences between Rustichini's work and ours. First, we consider a very
general set of learning rules instead of only two specic rules. Second, and most importantly,
in our setting players don't use the whole history of past payo realizations. Instead, as pre-
scribed by reinforcement, players learn using the information they have from their most recent
payo experiences. The reason why we are interested in a setting where players have limited
memory is that empirical and theoretical literature in psychology and economics agrees that
limited memory is a better assumption for modeling human behavior than innite memory
(see for example, Rubinstein (1998), Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) and Conlisk (1996)).
As already mentioned, the learning rules considered in this paper have the property of
being reinforcing. According to reinforcement learning, actions that were more successful
today are more likely to be adapted for tomorrow. Reinforcement has been found to be
one of the main driving forces of human behavior in repeated decision problems. For some
detailed expositions on reinforcement learning and its relationship with real life behavior the
reader is referred to Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho
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When both realized and foregone payos are observed, reinforcement is translated into
being more likely to play tomorrow the action that was better today. For this setting, we use
a generalization of the best response behavior that we call the Stochastic Better Response.
Under the Stochastic Better Response, the probability of playing tomorrow a given action
increases if and only if today that action was better than the other one. The magnitude of
the change in probabilities of playing either action depends on the specic functional form
used. The Stochastic Better Response is a very general learning rule that allows players
to respond to the magnitude and not just the ordering of payos of each action. Note
that the Stochastic Better Response is a dierent concept from the Stochastic Better Reply
Dynamics (Josephson (2007)). The Stochastic Better Reply Dynamics are the dynamics for
the evolution of strategies resulting when players use the better response, which is a particular
case of the Stochastic Better Response.
When foregone payos are not observed, players can not directly compare the perfor-
mance of both actions within the same time period. In this case, players reinforce (possibly
negatively) the action they played. How much they reinforce this action will depend on the
payo achieved. We use a general case of the Cross (1973) learning rule that also generalizes
the rules in B orgers, Morales and Sarin (2004) (BMS, henceforth). We call this rule the Gen-
eral Reinforcement Rule. Note that players could use the General Reinforcement Rule even if
they observe foregone payos. While this implies that players are disregarding information,
we will show that it may be optimal to do so.
Under the Cross Learning Rule, players increase the probability of playing the action just
played by the payo yielded by that action. An interesting result shown by B orgers and Sarin
(1997) is that a population that plays according the Cross Learning Rule exhibits a behavior
that converges to replicator dynamics.
The rules in BMS can incorporate aspiration levels (exogenous or endogenous): in other
words, if the payo of the action chosen is higher than the aspiration level, then the probability
of playing that action increases for the next period. On the other hand, if the payo achieved
by the action chosen is smaller than the aspiration level, then the probability of playing that
action decreases for next period. The rules in BMS are linear on payos. We relax this by
allowing for any increasing function on realized payo.
In the case where foregone payos are observed, we show that the continuous time limit of
the evolution of strategies converges to a situation where every period every action is played
with a constant probability bounded away from 1. The specic value of the probability by
which each action is played at every period will depend on two things: rst, the dierence
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and, second, on the probabilities that the limiting distribution of the Markov chain for states
puts on each state. The behavior found in this setting is a generalization to what is know
as probability matching. Under probability matching, if an action is best a fraction x of
the time, then in any given period it is played with probability x. The best reply matching
behavior is clearly suboptimal. While some experimental papers report that this behavior is
observed in real life (see, for example, Rubinstein (2002), Siegel and Goldstein (1959)), there
does not seem to be consensus as to whether probability matching is in fact present in the
behavior of real life agents (see, for instance, Vulkan (2000) and Shanks et al. (2002)).
The results found in this informational setting are also closely related to the ndings by
Kosfeld et al. (2002). They study a setting where a nite set of players repeatedly play a
normal-form game. Players adapt their strategies by increasing the probability of playing a
certain action only if this action is a best reply to the actions played by the other agents.
Hence, the rule they use is a particular case of the Stochastic Better Response in which the
magnitude of payos is irrelevant for the updating of strategies. Our setting is also dierent
from theirs in that players do not play against other players but against nature and in that
we consider a general class of rules instead of only one. Kosfeld et al. (2002) nd that the
continuous time limit of the system converges to a best-reply matching equilibrium. In a
best-reply matching equilibrium each player plays an action with a probability that is equal
to the probability that this action is a best response to the actions of the other players. The
probability matching behavior found in this paper for games against nature is the equivalent
to the best-reply matching equilibrium found in Kosfeld et al. (2002). In Section 2.5.1 this
issue is discussed in more depth.
In our second informational setting, when foregone payos are not observed, we show that
the population may end up playing a suboptimal action. The population surely selects the
action that has higher average payo only if the dierence between the average payo of the
two actions is high enough. Hence, the system may lock-on to a suboptimal action. In this
respect, our work extends Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) results to a general set of learning
rules and an environment that may not be stationary.
Our results are rounded o by characterizing the ecient rules for both informational
settings. A striking result is that when foregone payos are observed, it is optimal to ignore
the extra information conveyed by the payo of the action not chosen. That is, players are
better o by learning using the General Reinforcement Rule, which only uses the information
of the realized payo. This is due to the fact that observing foregone payos leads players to
adopt the action that is best today but may be not the best in the long run. That is, players
are "distracted" by observing the performance of all the actions. When foregone payos are
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that is, that have very cautious and show slow learning, then the population learns the optimal
action. These results from are in contrast to those of Rustichini's (1999). In Rustichini (1999),
when the population uses the exponential rule (fast learning) the best action is selected only
in situations where foregone payos are observed, whereas if populations uses the linear
rule (slow learning) best action is selected only in situations where foregone payos are not
observed. Here, instead, we nd that under reinforcement learning it is optimal to disregard
foregone payos and to exhibit slow learning in both informational settings.
This paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. Our rst contribution to the lit-
erature is the introduction new techniques for dealing with correlated states of nature. As
mentioned, very few papers have studied the situation in which the future realization of the
state of nature depends on its past realizations. Most papers on learning consider either that
the environment does not change or that it changes independently of past realizations. This
is due to the technical diculties involved in dealing with correlated realizations of states. In
this paper we show how these diculties can, at least partially, be overcome. The proofs for
the result for the Stochastic Better Response demonstrate how dependent randomness can
be dealt with by showing that for any possible realization of states of nature, the position
of the system in the future can be approximated by the dierences in speed of convergence
towards each action.
The proof of the result for the case where foregone payos are not observed extends Ellison
and Fudenberg's (1995) result to the case where the distribution of payos is not stationary.
We show that the behavior of a system that evolves according to a Markov Chain can be
approximated by the behavior of a system in which the probability of each state occurring is
independent and equal to the limiting distribution of the Markov Chain.
Our second contribution is the extension of the knowledge about stimulus response learn-
ing models and evolutionary models. The dierences in the behavior of the population under
the two informational settings are very intriguing and of interesting application for real life
situations. For instance, why can inferior technologies come to dominate the market? A
well known example is that when the video format VHS took over from the superior format
Betamax. The model can explain that if the two technologies are not too dierent in terms
of performance, the stochastic evolution of nature can lead the population to lock on the
suboptimal choice forever. In the example with video formats, during the rst months after
the release of both technologies, Betamax tapes could not hold an entire movie. This caused
the population to slowly adopt the VHS format. Once the true potential of Betamax was
revealed, it was too late, consumers had already locked on the inferior technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. The two
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Section 2.5 presents a discussion and a deeper comparison of this work with the existing
literature. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a continuum of identical players of measure 1. Every period t = 0;1;::: players
in the population have to choose between action 1 or action 2. The payo of each player at
time t depends on her action and on the current state of nature st 2 f1;:::;mg. If a player
chooses action i and the state equals j then she gets a payo ij 2 [0;1] with i 2 f1;2g
and j 2 f1;:::;mg. Note that the payo of each player does not depend on the actions
played by others but only on her own action and the state of nature. We assume there is
no weakly dominant action. That is, there exists no i 2 f1;2g such that ij   ij for all
j 2 f1;:::;mg. Without loss of generality we assume that for some h < m, 1j  2j for
j  h and 2j > 1j for j > h. That is, in the rst h states action 1 yields at least the same
payo as action 2. In the remaining states, action 2 yields more payo than action 1. Finally,
we dene j as the vector of payos of action 1 and action 2 in state j, j = (1j;2j).
The sequence of states of nature fstg1
t=0 follows a discrete Markov process P with m  2
states. The probability of transiting from state i to state j is given by ij 2 [0;1]. We assume
the Markov chain to be irreducible and aperiodic. Hence, if ij = 0 for some i;j 2 f1;:::;mg
then there exists a sequences of states k1;k2;:::;kn 2 f1;:::;mg with n  m such that
ik1;k1;k2;:::;kn;j 6= 0. We dene  2 [0;1]m as the limiting distribution of the Markov
chain P where i is the weight the limit distribution puts in state i. An environment is
dened then by the payo vectors together with a transition matrix, f(1;:::;m);Pg.
A strategy is the probability of playing each action at a given period. We denote by
t
i 2 [0;1] with i 2 f1;2g and t 2 f0;1;:::g the probability of playing action i at time
t. Dene  = (
1;
2) 2 [0;1]2 as the strategy that maximizes payo in the long run.








j ( 11j +  22j):
Since we are dealing with a continuum of population, Law of Large Numbers applies and
we have that t
i is also the fraction of players playing action i at time t. In an abuse of
notation, throughout the paper we will refer to t
i as both the probability for a single player
of playing action i at time t and the fraction of the population playing action i at time t.
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ig1
t=0 is an irreducible and aperiodic
Markov process on [0;1] for i 2 f1;2g. The aim of the paper is to characterize, if it exists,
the invariant distribution of such process.
The timing within each time period works as follows. First, players choose actions ac-
cording to their strategies. Then, nature decides the state. Third, payos are realized and
players observe their payo and possibly forgone payos. The possibility of observing fore-
gone payos depends on the informational setting being considered. Finally, players update
their strategies.
When updating their strategies, players use the following information: their strategy at
the beginning of the period, the action they played and the payo they got and possibly the
payo the other action would have yielded (foregone payos). Formally, a learning rule is a
function b : [0;1]2 f1;2g2 [0;1]2 ! [0;1]2. That is, a function that maps three arguments,
strategies for the present period, action played and payo gotten and action not played and
foregone payo, into the strategies for the following period. The functional form of b will
depend on the specic learning rule under consideration.
2.3 Informational Settings
2.3.1 Forgone Payos are Observed
When both realized and foregone payos are observed, players best respond to the environ-
ment by increasing the probability of playing at the next period the action that was most
successful at the present period. We use a generalization of the best response behavior that
we call the Stochastic Better Response.
We write t+1
i jj to denote the value of t+1
i given that at period t the state of nature, st,










where  > 0 is a learning speed parameter. The function f : [0;1]2 ! [0;1] maps the payo
of the action that yielded higher payo and the payo of the other action into a number
between 0 and 1. This function is interpreted as the probability of adopting or learning the
action that was best given today's state of nature. The only requirement on f is that it
must be weakly increasing in the payo of the action that yielded higher payo and weakly
decreasing in the payo of the other action. That is, f is weakly increasing (decreasing) in ij
only if ij > (<) ij. We set f(j) = 0 if and only if 1j = 2j. In other words, we assume
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payo. The function f could also be a constant. In the case where the function f is constant
and equals 1, the learning rule is equivalent to the standard best response in which players
show inertia with probability 1    (as in Samuelson (1994) and Kosfeld et al. (2002)).
The intuition behind the Stochastic Better Response is the following. In each period, all
players observe the payo of the action chosen and the payo of the other action. Then every
player updates her strategy in the following way. The probability of playing action i in the
next period is increased if and only if action i yielded higher payo than the other action
in the current period. The increase in the probability of playing action i will depend on the
dierence in payos between the two actions.
A dierent interpretation of this same rule uses the fact that i can be considered as the
fraction of population playing action i deterministically. Under this interpretation, at every
period, players that did not play the best action will change their actions (best response to
the environment) with some probability. The probability of changing action depends on the
dierence in payo between the two actions. The Stochastic Better Response is an individual
learning rule because actions played by other players have no eect on the updating of the
one's own strategy.
As an example, we can look at two possible ways of writing the Stochastic Better Response.





















A second example could be the following, where only the payo of the best action at the










2.3.2 Foregone Payos are not Observed
When foregone payos are not observed, players have no means of directly comparing the
performance of both actions within the same time period. In this case, players reinforce
(possibly negatively) the action they played. How much they reinforce this action will depend
on the payo achieved. We use a general case of the Cross (1973) learning rule that also
generalizes the rules in BMS. We call this rule the General Reinforcement Rule.
Let t+1
i jkj be the probability by which a player plays action i at time t + 1 given that
action k was played at time t and state at time t, st, was j. The General Reinforcement Rule
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1 j2j = t
1   t
1g(2j);
and similarly for t+1
2 j1j and t+1
2 j2j. The only assumption we make in g : [0;1] !
[ 1;1] is that it must be weakly increasing in its argument. If g(ij) = ij then we have
the Cross Learning Rule. For the rules in BMS we have that g(ij) = Aij + Bijij for
given Aij 2 R and Bij 2 R for i 2 f1;2g and j 2 f1;:::;mg. BMS show that setting




1g and Bij = 1=maxf1   0
1;0
1g for all i;j results
in the best monotone rule. A rule is dened to be monotone if the expected probability of
playing the action that is best given today's state increases. A rule is said to be the best
monotone rule if the expected increase in playing the best action from one period to another
is highest among all monotone rules. Since BMS study a setting in which the evolution of
nature follows a stationary distribution, the action that is best today is the action that is
best at every period. In our setting the action that is best today may not be the best action
tomorrow due to the Markovian evolution of the states of nature. This particular dierence
will have important consequences in the optimality properties of the rules in BMS.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Results - Foregone payos are Observed
Before going to the formal results, we present a small discussion on the behavior of the system
under the Stochastic Better Response. First, note that the biggest dierence in the behavior
of the two rules that we consider lies in the way they behave when i is close to the corners
(0 and 1). In particular, under the Stochastic Better Response the corners are not absorbing
while the opposite occurs under the General Reinforcement Rule.
Assume for this short discussion that there are only two states of nature. Under the
Stochastic Better Response, the speed at which a player adopts an action slows down as the
probability of playing that action increases. That is, consider that action 1 is played with
a high probability and that today action 1 yielded a higher payo than action 2. Then the
increase in the probability of playing action 1 will be small. On the other hand, consider
that action 1 is played with a small probability and today action 1 yielded higher payo than
action 2. In this case the probability of playing action 1 next period increases sharply.
Figure 2.1 shows the movements of the probability of playing action i (i) as a response
to an action being better than the other in the current period. As above, assume that an
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yielded a higher payo than the other action at the present period is low.
Figure 2.1: Stochastic Better Response
As one could possibly guess already, the Stochastic Better Response will not converge
to any of the corners. To study convergency, we consider the limit case when , which
can be viewed as the size of the changes in i, gets arbitrarily small. Once such a limit is
taken, the Stochastic Better Response converges to a single point. This issue can be seen
much more clear by looking at Figure 2.2, where a simulation is conducted. The specic
learning rule used is given by equation 2.1. The value of the parameters is set to m = 2,
11 = 0:5;12 = 0:3;21 = 0:1;22 = 0:6 and 12 = 21 = 0:3. The initial value 1 was set to
0
1 = 0:5. The gure depicts the same simulation, the same random seed, for two situations:
one in which  = 1 and another in which  = 0:05.
Figure 2.2: Simulation - Stochastic Better Response
By studying the behavior of the system when  is made arbitrarily small we are char-
acterizing the continuous time limit of i. When  is taken to zero the adjustment in the
strategies is made arbitrarily small while keeping constant the speed at which the environ-
44
Rivas, Javier (2008), Cooperation in Repeated Games, Bounded Rational Learning and the Adoption of Evolving Technologies 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26189ment changes. For other papers that use this continuous time limit approximation in settings
somewhat dierent from ours see, for example, B orgers and Sarin (1997) and Bena m and
Weibull (2003).
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of (1;2) under the Stochastic
Better Response when  is arbitrarily small. Later in this section we present a sketch of the




















The interpretation of the result is the following. For simplicity of the exposition let us
focus on the evolution of the variable 1 and assume again that there are only two states
of nature. The point ~  corresponds to the situation where an increase in t
1 due to action
1 yielding higher payo at time t than action 2 would be equivalent to the decrease in t
1








1 j2   t
1
 . In Figure 1, the point ~  would be such that the size of
the arrows (or jumps) towards the left from a given point t
1 is the same as the size of the
arrows towards the right from this same point t
1. Hence, ~  is the point where the marginal
movements towards action 1 and towards action 2 are equalized.
One can easily check that ~  < 1, so it will never be the case that the best action in the
long run is played with probability 1. For the general case where the Markov chain has m





inequality holds in the simulation in Figure 2.2. However, for that simulation we have that
~  = 0:57. That is, in the long run at any given period action 1 is played with probability of




j=1 j2j then the t
1 that
maximizes payo in the long run is  = 1.
Let us now look at a sketch of the proof. To studying the convergence of the sequence
1 we rst show that it suces to study the convergence of a sequence y = fytg1
t=^ t, for ^ t
large enough, which evolves in a world with just 2 states of nature and symmetric transition
matrix.
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1g1








> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(1) with probability 1
. . .
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(h) with probability h
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(h+1) with probability h+1
. . .
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(m) with probability m
:








Hence, the expected value of both 1 and ^ 1 converge in probability to the same value. This
is because the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic. Now dene the sequence
y = fytg1
t=^ t as y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1 and dene recursively
yt+1 =
(
yt + 2(1   yt)
P
j:1j2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
yt   2yt
P
j:1j<2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
:
Note that the variable y evolves according to the expected movement in the long run of
the variable ^ 1. It can be easily seen that yt = ^ t
1 implies E0(yt+1) = E0(^ t+1
1 ). Hence, since
y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1, the distribution of both yt and ^ t
1 is aperiodic and both E0(y
^ t+1) and E0(^ 
^ t+1
1 ) are
linear in their arguments, we can state that E0(y
^ t+k) = E0(^ 
^ t+k
1 ) for any k 2 N. Moreover,
we have that for any t > ^ t, equation 2.2 must hold. Hence, we have that for any " > 0 and




1)   E0(yt)j > "

= 0:
Furthermore, by making  arbitrarily small we make the variance of both random variables
yt and t
1 to shrink to zero. Thus, their limiting distribution puts weight on a single point.
In other words, y and 1 must converge in probability to a xed value  y and   respectively.
Since E0(y
^ t+k) converges to E0(
^ t+k
1 ) for all k 2 N, we must have that  y =  . Hence, instead
of studying the convergence of the variable 1 we focus on the convergence of the variable y.
This is more formally stated in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
Note now that the point yt = ~ , with ~  as dened in Proposition 1, solves the equation
yt + 2(1   yt)
X
j:1j2j
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1g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that E0(yt+1
1 )  E0(yt
1). Therefore,
y1 is a super-martingale with lower bound ~ . Thus, by the martingale convergence theorem,
y1 converges in probability to ~ . This implies that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~ .
Dene now the sequence y2 = fyt
2g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Therefore, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
2) for all t > ^ t. Note that E0(yt+1
1 )  E0(yt
2). Hence,
y2 is a sub-martingale with upper bound ~ . Thus, by the martingale convergence theorem,
y2 converges in probability to ~ . This implies that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~ .
Hence, we know that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~  and E0(yt)  ~ . This implies that for
all t > ^ t, E0(yt) = ~ . Since the variance of y shrinks to zero as  is made arbitrarily small,
we have that y converges in probability to ~  as  is made arbitrarily small. Combined with
the fact that y converges in probability to 1, this implies that 1 converges in probability
to ~ .
2.4.2 Results - Foregone Payos are not Observed
We recall that the probability by which a player plays action i at time t+1 given that action
k was played at time t and state at time t was j is denoted by t+1
i jkj and given by
t+1








1 jj, which is the probability of playing action 1 at time t + 1 given that state
was j, equals t
1 +t
2g(1j) if action 1 was played at time t and t
1  t
1g(2j) if action 2 was
played at time t. Action i with i 2 f1;2g is played at time t with probability t
i. Hence, since
we are dealing with a continuum of players, we can use Law of Large Numbers to state that
t+1
1 jj = t
1t+1
1 j1j + t
2t+1
1 j2j:
This can be rewritten as
t+1




1 + (1   t
1)g(1j)

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t+1
i jj = t
i
 




Note that if we set g(ij) = ij, as in the Cross Learning Rule, the resulting law of motion
for i is the discreet time version of the Replicator Dynamics. That is, if g(ij) = ij then
we have that
t+1









The General Reinforcement Rule behaves completely dierently to the Stochastic Better
Response. Under the General Reinforcement Rule, the changes in the variable t
i become
smaller as t
i gets closer to either bound. For example, consider that action 1 is played with
a high probability. Then the change in i will be small independently of whether action 1
yielded higher payo than action 2 or the other way around. Figure 2.3 shows the movements
of 1 under the General Reinforcement Rule as a response to the environment.
Figure 2.3: General Reinforcement Rule
As we see, the process will spend almost no time in intermediate values of i. This will
allow us to draw our conclusions from analyzing only the behavior of i in the neighborhoods
of its bounds. In this respect, our analysis will partially rely on the approach by Ellison and
Fudenberg (1995).
Figure 2.4 shows a simulation for the General Reinforcement Rule for the case where
g(ij) = ij and with the same parameters as the ones used in Figure 2.2. The gure plots
the result of the same simulation performed with two dierent random seeds.
It can be seen that the General Reinforcement Rule quickly converges to a situation in
which all the population plays the same action a fraction 1 of the time. An interesting
thing to note is that the action selected by the General Reinforcement Rule does not coincide
necessarily with the action that is best in the long run. The simulation on the right-hand side
shows a situation in which the General Reinforcement Rule converges to a situation where
all players in the population are playing the suboptimal action. As we will see, this is the
result of the two actions performing not too dierently in terms of payos in the long run.
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The following proposition, whose proof is presented in the Appendix, characterizes the
convergence of the sequence 1.
Proposition 2. Dene 
j = 1 + g(1j)   g(2j) and ^ 





j > 0; (2.4)
m X
j=1
j log ^ 
j > 0: (2.5)
1. If both (2.4) and (2.5) hold then limt!1 t
1 does not exist.
2. If (2.4) holds but (2.5) does not then limt!1 t
1 = 1.
3. If (2.5) holds but (2.4) does not then limt!1 t
1 = 0.
4. If neither (2.4) nor (2.5) hold then limt!1 t
1 has full support over f0;1g.
Since 2 = 1   1 the convergence of the sequence 2 follows for the proposition above.
An important fact revealed by proposition above is that the process may fail to converge to
the best action. Consider for simplicity the Cross Learning Rule, where g(ij) = ij. Action





condition can be rewritten as
Pm
j=1 j
j  1. However, even if
Pm
j=1 j




j < 0 holds and hence 1 may not converge to 1. To make this
point more clear consider the case in which m = 2 and 1 = 2 = 0:5. That is, there are
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corollary characterizes the convergence of 1 in this case when action 1 is better in the long
run than action 2.
Corollary 1. Assume g(ij) = ij, m = 2, 1 = 2 = 0:5 and 11 + 12 > 21 + 22.
- If 11 + 12   21   22   (11   21)(22   12) > 0 then limt!1 1 = 1.
- Otherwise, limt!1 1 has full support over f0;1g.
Proof. We can rewrite inequalities (2.4) and (2.5) from Proposition 2 for the case with m = 2
and 1 = 2 = 0:5 as follows:
log
1 + log
2 > 0 (2.6)
log ^ 
1 + log ^ 
2 > 0: (2.7)
The conditions (2.6) and (2.7) can be rewritten as 
1
2 > 1 and ^ 
1^ 
2 > 1. These in turn
can be rewritten as
11 + 12   21   22   (11   21)(22   12) > 0; (2.8)
21 + 22   11   12   (11   21)(22   12) > 0: (2.9)
It can be easily seen that equation (2.9) is never holding. Hence, by Proposition 2, if the
inequality (2.8) holds then we have that limt!1 1 = 1, whereas if (2.8) does not hold we
have that limt!1 1 has full support over f1;2g.
For the process to select the best action, the two actions need to perform signicantly
dierently. That is, having action 1 better than action 2, 11 + 12   21   22 > 0, is not
enough for the process to select the best action.
Now we present the intuition for the proof of Proposition 2 for the case where g(ij) = ij.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies partially on the analysis by Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
In Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), the realization of states of nature is independent of past
values of states. In order to be able to apply Ellison and Fudenberg's analysis to our setting,
we proceed as follows. Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic, the
state of nature many periods ahead is independent of the state of nature today. This means
that by the law of large numbers, we can take the probability of each state being realized
many periods ahead as the limiting probability placed on it by the Markov chain. Therefore,
for the rest of the exposition we consider that the realization of states is independent of past
values. For a formal proof the reader is referred to Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
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1   p be the probability by which state 1 occurs. Since the process spends almost no time
at its intermediate values, it suces to examine the convergence of the variable i when it
is close to its boundary values (0 and 1). To make the exposition clearer, we focus on the
sequence 2 = 1 1. Imagine that 2 is arbitrarily close to 0. Then we can rewrite (2.3) as
follows:
t+1





j = 1+g(2j) g(1j) for j 2 f1;2g and o(t
2) is a term of order higher than 2 and
hence is negligible when 2 is arbitrarily small. Without loss of generality we can assume













Since 11 > 21 and 12 < 22 we have that 
2 > 1 > 
1 > 0. Finally, note that 1j  2j
with probability 1   p and 1j < 2j with probability p.
The sequence 2 converges to 0, or 1 converges to 1, if and only if the sequence x =
fxtg1
t=0 with xt = logt
2 converges to  1. The process for x when t





1 + xt with probability 1   p
log
2 + xt with probability p
:
Therefore, Et(xt+1) = (1   p)log
1 + plog
2 + xt. Hence, if (1   p)log
1 + plog
2 > 0
then Et(xt+1) > xt, which implies that x is a sub-martingale. Thus, by the Martingale
Convergence Theorem, if (1   p)log
1 + plog
2 > 0 then x cannot converge to  1 and
hence 2 cannot converge to 0. Which implies that 1 does not converge to 1.
Ellison and Fudenberg's (1995) result is presented here for the readers' convenience.




1zt + o(zt) with probability 1   p

2zt + o(zt) with probability p
:
Suppose that 











then zt cannot converge to 0 with positive probability.
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then there are  > 0 and " > 0 such that if z0 <  then P
 












there is a  z > 0 such that for all z0 > 0 and all t 2 f0;1;:::g, P
 
zt <  z

= 0.
2.4.3 Ecient Learning Rules
We say that a learning rule is ecient if it is able to select to optimal action in the long run.
An interesting result is that if foregone payos are observed, then it is optimal to disregard
this information and to act as if only realized payos were observed.
When players observe the performance of both actions they can be \distracted" towards
the suboptimal action by the Markov chain. This is because even if the population plays
the optimal action with a high probability they can still observe the performance of the
suboptimal action. Hence, since the suboptimal action is the best action for some states
of nature, randomness can constantly lead some players in the population to adopt the
suboptimal action for many periods in time. Thus, the continuous time limit of the process
converges to a situation in which the suboptimal action is played with a positive probability.
This is formally proven in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the Stochastic Better Response, for some " > 0 there exists no f :
[0;1]2 ! [0;1] such that for all the environments (f1;:::;mg;P) we have that j~ 1 
1j < ".




j=1 j2j. Hence, we have
that 
1 = 1.
The proof goes by contradiction. Assume that for all " > 0 there exists a function
f : [0;1]2 ! [0;1] such that for all the environments (f1;:::;mg;P), j~ 1   
1j < ".
This can be rewritten as follows: there exists a sequence of functions f = ffng1
n=0 with




n!1 ~ 1(fn) = 
1 = 1;
where ~ 1(fn) is the value of ~ 1 associated with the function fn.















Take now an environment E = (f1;2g;P) where 0 < 11 < 22 and ij = 0 for all
i 6= j. We could consider more general environments but that will only complicate the
exposition leaving the logic of the proof unchanged. P is such that action 1 is the optimal












Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible we have that 1 2 (0;1). Thus, we must








However, given that 11 < 22 and ij = 0 for all i 6= j, we have that fn(1) < fn(2) for
all n > 0. Hence, the sequence f is such that equation (2.13) cannot hold for the environment
E, a contradiction.
The logic behind the proof is that if a learning rule makes the population to select the
optimal action in a given environment E0, then the rule must magnify the payos of each
action. This can be seen in equation (2.11), where, according to the learning rule, payos are
magnify to innity. However, if this is the case, an environment E can be found such that
there is a very rare state for which the payo of the suboptimal action is much bigger than
the payo of the optimal action for that state. In this situation, the learning rule that make
the population to select the best action for environment E0 will fail to do so in environment
E.
When only realized payos are observed, a dierent force operates. Once the population
is almost always playing the optimal action, it is very dicult for players to take notice of
the periods in which the suboptimal action is giving more payo than the optimal action. A
drawback for the population under this informational setting is that if both actions perform
not too dierently in terms of payos, the population may lock on the suboptimal action
forever. However, a learning rule can be designed such that this ineciency is avoided.
The next result states two important features about eciency rules under the General
Reinforcement Rule. The rst one is that if learning is suciently cautious in that the
magnitude of payos is diminished then the population will select the optimal action. The
second important feature is that how cautious the learning has to be depends on how big the
dierence in the long run average payo of both actions is. The more both actions dier in
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while a learning rule that is very cautious may not be able to make the population to select
the best action, this will only happen in environments where the two actions perform very
similarly in the long run. Hence, when cautious learning is exhibited, the possible loss in
payo from not selecting the best action is small.













j=1 j2jj > ", then we have that limt!1 t
1 = 
1.




j=1 j2j. Hence, we have
that 




j=1 j2jj > ", we must have
that
Pm
j=1 j(x1j   x2j) > x" for all x > 0.
Using the rst order Taylor series for the logarithmic function around 1 we get that
log(1 + x1j   x2j) = x1j   x2j + R1(1 + x1j   x2j);
where R1(1 + x1j   x2j) is the remainder term and x > 0. Using the Lagrange form we
can rewrite the remainder term as
R1(1 + x1j   x2j) =
 1=y2
2
(1 + x1j   x2j   1)2;
where y lies between 1 and 1+x1j x2j. We can bound the absolute value of the remainder
term in the following way:







Moreover, we have that
log(1 + x1j   x2j) = x1j   x2j + R1(1 + x1j   x2j)
 x1j   x2j   jR1(1 + x1j   x2j)j:
This can be rewritten as
m X
j=1
j log(1 + x1j   x2j) 
m X
j=1
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x"  
x2
2(1   x)2 = 0;
we get that
x =









j > 0: (2.15)
Similar arguments show that
m X
j=1
j log(1   x1j + x2j)   
m X
j=1




Hence, setting again x > 0 as in equation (2.14) yields
m X
j=1
j log ^ 
j < 0: (2.16)
Finally, combining inequalities (2.15) and (2.16) with Proposition 2 we get that if g(ij) =




j=1 j2jj > ", then
we have that limt!1 t
1 = 
1.
Note that if we set g(ij) as in Proposition 4, then lim"!0 g(ij) = 0. That is, a rule
that makes the population able to select the best action in all the environments must exhibit
arbitrarily slow learning.
2.5 Discussion
A way of enriching the model could be by adding idiosyncratic perturbations to payos.
This could be done by adding "ht to each payo ij. "ht are normally distributed zero mean
random variables that are independent across players h and time t. Since the rules we consider
under both scenarios can treat payos in a non-linear way, it is not true that the process
will converge to the same values as compared to the case without noise. The reason is the
same as why, for instance, E(x2) 6= E
 
(x + ")2
with E(") = 0. However, it can easily be
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treat payos linearly. Rules that treat payos linearly include the standard best response and
the bernoulli best response, for the case where foregone payos are observed, and the Cross
Learning Rule and the rules in BMS, for the case where foregone payos are not observed.
One might argue that if players had means of comparing the payo of the same action
across dierent time periods, they could recall dierent payo realizations over time and have
signicantly more information about the world they are living in. However, as showed by
Rustichini (1999) in a setting very similar to ours, even if players had innite memory and
could make this comparison, it is not true that they will learn the best action for sure.
2.5.1 Relating our results for the Stochastic Better Response with Kosfeld
et al. (2002)
Kosfeld et al. (2002) present a setting where a nite set of players play a normal-form game.
Each period players update their strategies myopically in the following way. They increase
the probability of playing an action if and only if that action is a best response to the action
played by the other players. If there are many actions that are a best response, the increase
in probability is shared equally among the actions that are a best response. Formally, let
t
i(j) be the probability by which player j plays action i at time t. Dene s j as the actions
played by all the players but j. Finally, let Bj(s j) be the set of actions that are a best
response for player j to s j and let jBj(s j)j be the cardinality of Bj(s j). The evolution in









where  2 (0;1) is exogenously given.
Comparing this rule with the Stochastic Better Response there are two points worth
noting. First, the rule in Kosfeld et al. (2002) is a particular case of the Stochastic Better
Response. Second, and most importantly, in our model players play against nature and not
against themselves. Hence, in Kosfeld et al. s (2002) setting, players best respond to the
actions of other players while in our setting players best respond to the actions of nature.
Kosfeld et al. (2002) show that the continuous time limit of their process, when  is made
arbitrarily small, converges to a so-called Best-Reply Matching Equilibrium. In a Best-Reply
Matching Equilibrium, for every player, the probability of playing a given action is equal
to the probability by which that action is a best response given the strategies of the other
players.
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behind them and in some situations are equivalent. Given that in our setting there are only






















i, which is the probability of playing action i, converges to the limiting proba-
bility that action i is a best response to the environment. Hence, the population strategies
match the nature's strategies, exactly as predicted by the Best-Reply Matching Equilibrium.
In our results for the Stochastic Better Response we consider a much bigger set of rules
than do Kosfeld et al. (2002). In particular, Kosfeld et al. (2002) only consider one rule.
However, for the specic rule used by Kosfeld et al. (2002), their results and ours come from
two dierent settings, as in their setting players play against each other while in our setting
players play against nature.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated learning within an environment that changes according to a
Markov chain and where players learn according to reinforcement. The payo of each possible
action depends on the state of nature. Since transition between states follows a Markov Chain,
there is correlation between today's state and tomorrow's state of nature. We studied two
dierent scenarios, one in which realized and foregone payos are observed and another in
which only realized payos are observed. Our contribution to the literature relies on the
fact that we studied reinforcement learning in a setting where the realization of the state of
nature is correlated with the past.
The literature has focused on the study of learning only in a setting where the realization
of states (or the shocks to payos) is independent of its past values. The reason for this is
the technical complexities involved in dealing with the correlated realization of states.
There are several questions left for further research. For the case where foregone payos
are observed, we only characterized the asymptotic distribution when the learning step goes
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probabilities of reaching each endpoint where the process does not converge deterministically
to a single point.
The present piece of work explores learning in two very general scenarios but there are
other settings that could be of interest. For instance, how does local interaction aect learning
when the environment changes according to a Markov chain? What if there are non-stochastic
idiosyncratic payo dierences among players? Our paper also tried to shed some light on
the techniques that could be used for dealing with such environments. We expect that in the
future more papers dealing with non stationary environments will appear.
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Appendix
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving the following lemma.
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10.2870/26189Lemma 2. For any " > 0 there exists a ^  > 0, ^ t(") > 0 and a sequence y = fytg1
t=^ t given by
y
^ t = 
^ t
1 and recursively for t > ^ t
yt+1 =
(
yt + 2(1   yt)
P
j:1j2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
yt + 2yt
P
j:1j<2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
;






1   ytj > "

= 0:
Proof. In the main text we dened h < m as the minimum natural number such that 1j  2j











> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(1) with probability 1
. . .
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(h) with probability h
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(h+1) with probability h+1
. . .
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(m) with probability m
:








The existence of such ^ t(") is guaranteed by the fact that the transition matrix P is
irreducible and aperiodic and by the Perron-Frobenius theorem applied to P. In an abuse of
notation, from now on we will simply write ^ t to denote ^ t(").
Since E0 is linear in both ^ t
1 and yt, we have that for all t > ^ t, ^ t
1 = yt if and only if
E0(^ t+1
1 ) = E0(yt+1). Thus, given that y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1, that E0 is linear in both ^ t
1 and yt and that
the distribution of both y and ^ 1 is aperiodic, we have that
E0(y
^ t+k) = E0(^ 
^ t+k
1 ) (2.19)
for all k 2 N.
Given the denition of y and equations (2.18) and (2.19) we must have that for any " > 0
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the variance of 1, ^ 1 and y gets arbitrarily small as well. Formally, for any " > 0 there
exists a ^  > 0 and a t > ^ t such that for any  < ^  and k 2 N we have that V art(t+k
1 ) < ",
V art(^ t+k
1 ) < " and V art(yt+k) < ".
Assume that 1 does not converge in probability to y. As  goes to zero the variance of
both 1 and y goes to zero. Hence, both variables will converge in probability to a single
point. That is, for all  > 0 there exists  1,  y,   > 0 and  t 2 N such that for all  <  
and t >  t, P
 
jt
1    1j > 

= 0 and P
 
jyt
1    yj > 





1)    1j > 

= 0 and P
 
jE0(yt
1)    yj > 

= 0.
If  1 6=  y, them we must have that exists a 








for all k 2 N, which contradicts equation (2.20). Hence, given that P
 
jt






1    yj > 

= 0 and  1 =  y, we must have that for any " > 0 there exists a ^  such that






1   ytj > "

= 0:
In the next lemma we establish that y converges in probability to ~ .





jyt   ~ j > "

= 0:
Proof. First, note that the point yt = ~ , with ~  as dened in Proposition 1, solves the
equation
yt + 2(1   yt)
X
j:1j2j




Dene now the sequence y1 = fyt
1g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that if yt > ~  then we have that
E0(yt+1) < E0(yt). This implies that E0(yt+1
1 ) < E0(yt
1) for all yt
1 > ~  and E0(yt+1
1 ) = E0(yt
1)
for yt
1 = ~ . Therefore, y1 is a super-martingale with lower-bound ~ . Thus, by the Martingale
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1 exists. Given that E0(yt+1
1 ) < E0(yt
1) for all yt
1 > ~  and
E0(yt+1
1 ) = E0(yt
1) for yt
1 = ~ , we must have that limt!1 yt
1 = ~ . This implies that y1
converges in probability to ~ .
Dene now the sequence y2 = fyt
2g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that if y < ~  then we have that
E0(yt+1) > E0(yt). This implies that E0(yt+1
2 ) > E0(yt
2) for all yt
2 < ~  and E0(yt+1
2 ) = E0(yt
2)
for yt
2 = ~ . Therefore, y2 is a sub-martingale with upper-bound ~ . Thus, by the Martingale
convergence theorem, limt!1 yt
2 exists. Given that E0(yt+1
2 ) > E0(yt
2) for all yt
2 < ~  and
E0(yt+1
2 ) = E0(yt
2) for yt
1 = ~ , we must have that limt!1 yt
2 = ~ . This implies that y2
converges in probability to ~ .














2   ~ j > "

= 0:
We know, given the denition of y, that for any " > 0 there exists a ^  > 0 and a t >  t
such that for any  < ^  and h > t we have that V art(yt+h) < ". This, together with the fact
that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) and E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t implies that for all t > maxf t;^ tg we
must have that limt!1 yt = ~ . This implies that y converges in probability to ~ .
Now we are able to prove the result in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We know from Lemma 2 that 1 converges in probability to y. From
Lemma 3 we also know that y converges in probability to ~ . Hence, we must have that 1
converges in probability to ~ . This is the result of the Proposition.
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Whenever t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 we have that
t+1
1 jj = t
1(1 + g(2j)   g(1j)) + o(t
1):
Dene 
j = 1 + g(2j)   g(1j) for all j 2 f1;:::;mg. Hence, given that g is increasing,
we have that 
i  1 < 
j if and only if 1i  2i and 1j < 2j. We can approximate the
equation for the evolution of the sequence 1 when t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 as follows:
t+1




Rivas, Javier (2008), Cooperation in Repeated Games, Bounded Rational Learning and the Adoption of Evolving Technologies 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26189Lemma 4. For any  t
1 2 (0;1) and any " > 0 there exists a t
1 <  t
1 and a  k 2 N such that
for k >  k
P
 t+k
1   ^ t+k
1
  > "

= 0;
where ^ t+ k













1 with probability m
for k >  k.
Proof. Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic and that the number of
states is nite, we have the standard result that the empirical distribution of states converges
to the limiting distribution of states. This can be rewritten as: for any  > 0 there exists a















for all j 2 f1;:::;mg.
We have seen before that if t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 we can write t+1
1 jj = 
jt
1. In
other words, for any  > 0 there exists a  1() 2 (0;1) such that if t











for all j 2 f1;:::;mg. This result can also be expressed as follows. For any  > 0 and any
k 2 N there exists a  1() 2 (0;1) such that if t








  > 

= 0: (2.22)
Hence, we have the following two facts. First, the probability of a state being realized a
suciently far way number of periods converges to the limiting distribution of the Markov
chain. Second, that t+1
1 jj behaves as 
jt
1 if t
1 is suciently small. Then, for k suciently
large and t




probability j. In other words, combining the results in equations (2.21) and (2.22) we can
write that for all " > 0 there exists a  k(") 2 N and  1(") 2 (0;1), such that for all k >  k(")
and t
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1 with probability m
for k >  k.





There is a positive probability that the sequence t





Proof. Reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1 in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), the sequence
1 can converge to zero if and only if the sequence y = log1 can converge to  1. Using again
the proof from Lemma 1 in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Lemma 4 in this Appendix,
the sequence y can converge to  1 only if
Pm
j=1 j log
j < 0. The result follows.
To study the situation in which the process is arbitrarily close to 1, we proceed as follows.
First, we dene wt = 1   t
1. Then we apply the analysis above to the variable wt. Dene
^ 
j = 1+g(2j) g(1j). Then we have that for all " > 0 there exists a  k 2 N and  w 2 (0;1)
such that for all k >  k and wt <  w we have that
P
 wt+k   ^ wt+k  > "

= 0;






1wt+k with probability 1
. . .
^ 
mwt+k with probability m
for k >  k.
An analogous to Lemma 5 when t
1 is close to 1 is the following:
Lemma 6. The sequence 1 cannot converge to 1 if
m X
j=1
j log ^ 
j > 0:
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m X
j=1
j log ^ 
j < 0:
Summing up the results from lemmas 5 and 6 the result in Proposition 2 follows.
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10.2870/26189Chapter 3 - The Eects of the
Market Structure on the Adoption
of Evolving Technologies
66




We study the speed at which new technologies are adopted depending on how the market
power is shared between suppliers and buyers. The suppliers consists of rms that own
technologies and sell then to the rms that demand the technologies, which then produce
output using these technologies. Three dierent market structures are considered: one where
the suppliers have all the market power; one where the buyers have all the market power
and a another where market power is shared and there is competition between suppliers
and buyers. Our results suggest, among other things, that competition reduces the pace of
adoption of new technologies.
3.1 Introduction
The adoption of new technologies is regarded as one of the main contributors to economic
growth (see, for instance, Lucas (1993), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). The dierences in
timing of the establishment of new technologies in countries or rms can lead to very dierent
growth rates. Adopting new technologies too quickly may be disadvantageous given the sunk
cost the establishment of a new technology carries. On the other hand, delaying the adoption
of a new technology can lead to high opportunity costs or to a disadvantageous position with
respect to competitors. This tradeo has been widely studied in the literature.
The literature so far has focused on the pace of the adoption of new technologies from
the perspective of a rm, which by adopting a new technology incurs a xed cost that will
be compensated over time by the benets from having a better technology. In this respect
the problem of adopting new technologies was reduced to two basic settings. In the rst
one, the problem of the rm was an optimal stopping problem (see for example Farzin et al.
(1998) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996)) where the rm has to decide, given a xed price,
at which point in time to adopt a new technology. In the second setting, rms adopting new
technologies play a game in which earlier adoption leads to high costs but to a temporary
advantageous position against competitors (see for example G otz (1999) and Chamley and
Gale (1994)). We change these two approaches and consider instead the game played between
the rms adopting new technologies and the rms that create and price the new technologies.
Hence, in our model as opposed to the existing literature, the price of the dierent available
technologies is endogenous. This allows us to study how the timing of the adoption of new
technologies is aected by the competition resulting from the interaction between supply and
demand.
In our model there is an exogenous process that determines the evolution of a technol-
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technology parameter means dierent technologies. The rms selling technologies own the
technologies and have no in
uence in their evolution. Their only role is to price the dierent
available technologies. Firms buying technologies have to decide at which point in time to
adopt a new technology. The game is then the following: sellers have the tradeo between
price and time, with higher price means higher income but at a later date. On the other
hand, the buyers have the tradeo between early adoption, which implies an earlier increase
in productivity, and late adoption, which implies a greater increase in productivity since a
more advanced technology is adopted. Our model explains then how these trade os are
solved when we consider three dierent market structures that are distinct in how the market
power is shared among the buyers and the suppliers.
In the rst market structure we consider there is only one rm selling technologies and
many rms willing to buy technologies. Hence, in this setting the supply side holds all the
market power and buyers act as a price takers. In the second market setting there are many
rms supplying technologies and only one rm interested in buying it. In this setting the
demand side holds all the market power and, therefore, sellers compete in prices and make
prots equal to their outside option of not participating in the market. In the last market
setting we consider there is one rm on each side of the market. In this last setting suppliers
and buyers compete for the surplus in the economy.
With our model we explore how the dierent market structures aect the adoption of
new technologies. This helps us in understanding why in some industries there is a huge
gap between the release of a new technology and its adoption while in some others new
technologies are adopted instantly as soon as they are released.
The present paper tries to shed light on the issue mentioned above, speed of adoption, with
respect to dierent market structures. Rather than focusing on the nature of the technology
itself or other factors, we chose to study how market power can explain these two issues. We
do not claim market power is the only reason why we observe dierent types of behavior.
However, as we shall show, it is a factor that can explain these dierences by itself and should
be taken into account. Furthermore, this is the rst paper that to our knowledge deals with
the interaction between sellers of technologies and buyers of technologies. Hence, as a rst
step to understanding the interaction between supply and demand in technology markets,
some simplifying assumptions are required. We assume that each buyer can only buy a new
technology once. Similarly, each seller is only allowed to sell a technology once. Doraszelski
(2004) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) presented a model of technology adoption where there is
only demand and the pricing of technologies is exogenous. They assume, as we do, that rms
only buy a new technology once. Doraszelski (2001) shows that the rm's decision problem,
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adoption of a new technology. Unfortunately, the assumption that each seller can only sell
technologies once is harder to justify and made only for analytical convenience.
In our results we nd that if there is competition between suppliers and buyers, then the
adoption of new technologies occurs at a slower pace than when either suppliers or buyers
hold all the market power. This suggests that competition between both sides of the market,
instead of competition within each side, can delay the adoption of new technologies. A
striking result is that when only one side of the market holds all the power adoption occurs
at the same pace independently of which one that is. When only one side of the market holds
all the power the total surplus in the economy is maximized. Hence, from the point of view
of the speed of adoption of new technologies the only actual dierence between the situation
where only one side holds all the market power is how the total surplus in the economy is
divided between the sides of the market.
From the theoretical point of view, many models study the optimal timing of technology
adoption. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) present a model where the decision maker increases
productivity by either learning by doing or by switching to a better technology. The eect
of learning by doing for any given technology is bounded and hence there comes a point in
which the only way to improve productivity is by upgrading to a better technology. Adopting
a new technology is not costly in monetary terms but in productivity terms. When a new
technology is adopted, it takes time to learn how to use it. Hence, a new technology brings
more possibilities of growth for the long run but decreases productivity in the short run.
Karp and Lee (2001) extend this model by introducing discount factors.
Farzin et al. (1998) present a model where the increase in productivity caused by the
adoption of the newest technology is know only in expected terms. Adopting a new technology
has a sunk cost that is independent of the productivity level of the new technology. In a recent
work by Doraszelski (2004) a distinction between technological breakthroughs and engineering
renements is introduced.
G otz (1999) introduces a model of monopolistic competition where the technological
improvement happens just once and the cost of adopting such technological improvement
decreases over time. In G otz's model delaying the adoption of a new technology gives a
comparative advantage in the long run but it is disadvantageous in the short run.
In a paper by Chamley and Gale (1994) a population faces the decision of whether to
adopt a new technology or not. The performance of the new technology is unknown but there
are information externalities arising when other players adopt the technology. Delaying the
adoption of a new technology has benets given the extra information about that technology
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benecial given the monopoly power that it provides.
From the empirical perspective, there is no doubt that the timing of technology adoption
has been a concern. Hoppe (2002) presents a literature review on this topic. To cite some,
Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) present a study on the diusion of CNC (computer numer-
ically controlled machine tools) in the UK engineering industry. Factors determining the
delaying in the adoption of the new technology were found to be, among others, the learning
eects and the cost of the new technology. Weiss (1994) studied the adoption of a new process
technology called the surface-mount technology by printed circuit board manufacturers.
In the remainder of this section we present a survey on the relevant literature. In section
3.2 the model is presented. Section 3.3 presents our ndings for the three dierent market
structures considered. In section 3.4 we present a comparative statics analysis. Finally,
section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider a continuous time model where the two sides of the market, suppliers and buyers,
play a repeated game. On the supply side of the market there are rms selling technologies,
sellers, while on the demand side of the market there are rms buying technologies, buyers.
An exogenous process determines the evolution of new technologies, which are sold by the
sellers to the buyers. The seller rms have to put a price to these technologies while buyer
rms produce output given an initial level of technology and decide when to buy a better
technology. We dene ns  1 to be the number of sellers and nd  1 to be the number of
buyers. All rms are assumed to be risk neutral.
Three dierent market settings are considered. These three market settings are explained
in detail in their respective subsections, but here we brie
y introduce them to the reader.
In the rst market setting we considered, the supply side holds all the market power and
rms in the demand side act as price taker. Consequently, for this setting we assume there is
one rm supplying technologies and many rm interested in buying them. Alternatively to
one rm selling technologies one can assume that many sellers collude to gain all the market
power. In the second market setting, the demand holds all the market power and, hence, it
extracts all the surplus in the economy. Hence, in this setting there is one rm interested in
buying technologies and many rms producing technologies. The third setting we consider
has the supply, that consists of a single rm, and demand, that also consists of a single rm,
competing for the surplus in the economy.
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Sellers then can embed these new patents into products that they then release onto the
market. To be a bit more precise consider the case of micro processors for computers. Intel
develops new micro processors that are then sold by computer manufactures to consumers.
In this example, Intel is represented in the model by the exogenous process determining
the evolution of technologies, computer manufactures are represented by the rms selling
technologies and consumers deriving utility from buying computers is represented in the
model by the rms in the demand side that produce output given a level of technology.
Technologies are denoted by a parameter  where higher  means better, more ecient,
technology. Seller rms own these technologies. Buyer rms are all endowed with the same
initial level of technology, denoted by 0. As a simplication, we assume that only two
dierent levels of technology coexists in the economy at any given point in time t. These are
the initial level of technology, 0, and the newest technology (t). Sellers have no control over
the evolution or the level of technology available in the economy. It owns the technologies
and its only role is to put a price to the newest technology. If a rm from the supply side
sells a given technology  then it has to pay a x cost of C > 0 for the transaction to take
place. All sellers have access to the same set of technologies and pay the same amount C
when selling a technology to a rm in the demand side.
From t to t+dt the state of the newest technology, (t), evolves according to a Geometric
Brownian Motion:
d(t) = (t)dt + (t)dz(t);
where ; > 0 and z is a Brownian Motion (dened in the Appendix 3.A.1). The fact that
the technologies evolve following a Geometric Brownian Motion and the values of 0, , 
and z are all common knowledge.
The assumption that the evolution of technologies follows a Geometric Brownian Motion is
made simply for analytical convenience. Closed form solutions can be found for this dynamics
but not for other dynamics that could be used, like Poisson processes or standard Brownian
Motion. As it will be clear later when the analysis is presented, the specic motion assumed
for the technology has no qualitative implications for our results.
Note that at any point in time there may be technological regress, (t + dt) < (t). This
fact has no implications for the model and our results as if it is optimal not to buy the
technology  at a given price then it is not optimal to buy technology ~  <  at this same
price. To interpret the technological regress we can assume that when there is technological
regress these new technologies are inventions that simply did not work out and were never
made public.
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or to stick with the technology currently in use. Following Doraszelski (2004) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) we assume that the adoption of a new technology is a one-time irreversible
decision. Hence, once a buyer has adopted a new technology, it is stuck forever with that
technology. Doraszelski (2001) shows that the rm's decision problem, if we allow the rm
to buy new technologies more than once, is of the same form after each adoption of a new
technology. From a mathematical point of view, the problem of the rms on the demand side
is an optimal stopping problem. Similarly, we assume that each seller only sells technologies
once. Hence, in the market settings where there is only one rm supplying technologies,
once this rm has sold a technology no further adoption of technologies occurs. This latter
assumption is made for analytical convenience as it reduces the strategy space in a more
tractable way.
The timing of the game played between sellers and buyers is as follows: At time t = 0
each seller i 2 f1;:::;nsg decides on a price to charge for the newest technology Ii  0.
Then, at every period t > 0 and given the current level of technology (t), each buyer decides
whether to buy technology (t) at price I = mini2f1;:::;nsg Ii or to wait.
Let Ii  0 be the price charged by seller i 2 f1;:::;nsg. Let H(t) be the history of prices,
technologies, and decisions of the buyers up to period t. Hence, the element h(k) 2 H(t) for
k  t consists of the level of technology at time k, (k), the prices of all sellers fIigns
i=1 and
the decision of all buyers at time k of whether to buy the technology (k) at given prices
fIigns
i=1 or not.
A strategy for a seller i 2 f1;:::;nsg consists of a price Ii that depends on previous
history H(t): Ii : N2 ! R. Note that we are using Ii for both the action and the strategy.
This should not give rise to any confusion in our context. The price in the economy of the
newest technology is given by I = mini2f1;:::;nsg Ii. A strategy for a buyer consists of the
function S : HI   ! d where d = fbuy; waitg is the decision of the rm of whether to
buy the technology  at a price I or to wait. The equilibrium concept we use throughout the
paper is the standard Nash equilibrium (henceforth NE).








where () is the instantaneous prot of a rm on the demand side from using a technology 
and r > 0 is the interest rate. We assume  to be strictly increasing. Whenever necessary we
use a specic functional form for . We chose to focus on the more natural example, the one
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In this case we have that () = b where  > 0 and b > 1.
When a seller sells a technology  it has to pay a xed cost C > 0 for the transaction to
take place. In order to make the selling of technologies possible we assume C < (0)=r. If
technology  is sold at price I at time t then the present value of the prots of a buyer are
given by
(I   C)E(e rt):
In case a set of rms want to buy a given level of technology at the same price, then
each of these buyers has equal probability of making the purchase. Similarly in case a set of
rms wants to sell a given technology at the same price, then each of these sellers has equal
probability of selling the technology.
We dene  as the value of  at which the rst purchase of a new technology takes place.
Hence,  is a function of the price I. In Farzin et. al. (1998) Doraszelski (2004) and Dixit
and Pindyck (1994)  represents the level at which it is optimal to switch technology. In
our paper the interpretation of  is the same as in theirs. Moreover, the value of  is our
measure of the speed at which new technologies are adopted. Higher  means that more time
has to pass before a new technology is adopted and hence we say that the adoption occurs
at a slower pace.
3.3 Speed of Adoption of Technologies
3.3.1 The Supply Side Holds All the Market Power
In this setting there is one seller while there are at least 2 rms interested in buying the
technology. That is, ns = 1 and nd > 1. As mentioned before, if two or more buyers want
to buy the technology  at a given price I then each of these rms has equal probability
of being the one that actually buys the new technology. Given that the seller only sells a
technology once and that the instant initial prots of the buyers equal (0), the seller sets
up a price such that in the NE the buyer that buys the technology does not increase its
prots. Otherwise there will be another buyer willing to pay more for the technology and
still make positive prots. Moreover, the prots of the buyer must be at least the same as
its prots from not buying the technology as otherwise this rm is better o by not buying
a new technology and sticking to the original one, 0. Hence, in the NE of the game at hand
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condition for a NE is that the seller must play a best response to the other rms strategies.
Since in equilibrium (3.1) must hold, if we solve the maximization problem of the seller
subject to (3.1) the trigger level  obtained will be part of the NE of the game.
The problem of the seller is to maximize its expected prots given the trigger level 
from equation (3.1). Let  denote the hitting time of  on . That is,  is the inmum
point in time where   . Then E(e r) gives the expected discount factor at which the
seller values selling the technology. For a given  we can compute the value of E(e r) using
the analysis found in Dixit and Pindyck (1999). For the readers convenience we reproduce
this analysis in Appendix 3.A.2. When  follows a Geometric Brownian Motion the expected























In this paper, we use E(e r) as the measure for the speed at which new technologies are
adopted. A higher expected discount factor means a higher delay in the adoption of a new
technology. Since E(e r) depends ultimately on , higher  means slower adoption.
The problem of the seller is to choose I, to maximize prots given the eect of I on 








where (I) is given implicitly in equation (3.1).








In order for the optimal price I not to explode we need to impose the following condition
on .
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Assumption 1 is satised by the Cobb-Douglas prot function if and only if  > b. From
equation 3:3 we can get the equilibrium value of I. From I, we can then compute the value
of  in equilibrium using equation (3.1).
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function and from (3.3), after some rearrangement























Note that although all agents are risk neutral, changing , which is the variance of the
technology parameter, changes the optimal levels. This is because increasing  decreases
E(e r) and hence allows for a higher price for the new technologies while keeping  constant.
We explore this issue and perform other comparative statics in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 The Demand Side Holds All the Market Power
In this subsection we consider the case where the demand side has all the market power.
In this setting there is only one buyer and many, ns  2, sellers competing in price. As
mentioned earlier, if two or more sellers oer the technology at the same price and a buyer
decides to buy a new technology, then each seller has equal probability of being the one that
actually sells the technology to the buyer. Therefore, given that there is only one rm buying
technologies and that the rm buying technologies can only buy a new technology once, sellers
compete to the point where in equilibrium their prots from selling the technology must be
zero. Otherwise, standard competition a la Bertrand arguments apply and a seller could
decide on lowering the price of the technology to attract the buyer and still make positive
prots. Hence, an equilibrium condition is then
I = C: (3.5)
In this setting, and similarly to what occurred in the previous setting, in the NE the
zero prot condition (3.5) must hold. Hence, for computing the optimal level of  we must







 ()e rsds   Ie r
:
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rst term of
the objective function represents the prots of the rm before it buys the technology at time
. During this rst periods it produces using its initial level of technology 0. The second
term in the objective function is the prots once the rm bought a new technology at time .
From this point in time onwards the rm produces using the technology purchased at time
. Finally, the third term discounts the cost of buying the technology at time .
After some algebra and plugging in equation (3.5) we can rewrite the maximization prob-
lem of the buyer as (derivation found in the Appendix 3.A.3).
max
   (()   (0)   rC):
Taking the rst order condition we get that
()   0() = ((0) + rC): (3.6)
The equilibrium level of  is then given implicitly by equation (3.6). If we use the













Note that the equilibrium level of  when the demand holds all the market power is the
same as the one obtained when the supply holds all the market power. This is due to the fact
that when only one side of the market holds all the power, the total surplus of the economy
is maximized, the Pareto optimal allocation is achieved. The only actual dierence between
the two settings lies on which side extracts all this surplus. We prove this statement below
by showing that the trigger level  under the two market settings above (given by equations
(3.4) and (3.7)) coincides with the Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 1. The value of  when only one side of the market holds all the power (sections
3.3.1 and 3.3.2) is Pareto Optimal in that it maximizes total surplus in the economy.
Proof. We solve for the Pareto optimal value of  by solving for the Nash bargaining solution.
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()   (0)   2rI + rC = 0;
 2(()   (0)   rI) + 0() = 0:














0(   (   b)) + rC
 ( + r(   b))
2r(   b)
:
Comparing the values of  in equations (3.4) and (3.8) gives the desired result.
In the next result we formalize the fact that the speed of adoption is the same indepen-
dently on which side of the economy holds all the market power.
Proposition 2. Independently on whether nd > 1 = ns or ns > 1 = nd (sections 3.3.1 and












Proof. Follows from (3.4) and (3.7).
3.3.3 Competition between Supply and Demand
For this setting we assume that there is only one seller and only one buyer. We solve for the
NE of the game by backwards induction. First, we compute the best response of the buyer
for any given pair I;. This will give us a value of  given any price I and level of technology
. Then, given this trigger level  as a function of I;, we compute the optimal price I.
This will give us the unique levels of  and I in the NE of the game.
The problem of the buyer is similar to the problem it faced in the setting where the buyer






 ()e rsds   Ie r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()   0() = (rI + (0)): (3.9)
Equation (3.9) is the implicit function for the optimal trigger level  as a function of the




From equation (3.9) we get the value of I as a function of . In order to simplify
computations, we maximize over  instead of over I and consider the function I given
implicity in equation (3.9). Therefore, the problem of the seller then becomes
max
   (()   0()   (0)   rC):
The rst order condition leads to
 ()2 + 0()(2   1)   00()2 + (0)2 + 2rC = 0: (3.10)
The system of equations (3.9) and (3.10) implicitly determine then the optimal levels
of  and I. Again we use the specic functional form for the prot function to get more
information about the process of adoption of new technologies. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas






















Hence, as we can infer from (3.11), under competition between supply and demand, the
adoption of technologies is expected to occur at a slower rate.
Proposition 3. The value of  under competition between supply and demand (section
3.3.3) is higher than when one side of the market holds all the power (sections 3.3.1 and
3.3.2).
Proof. Follows from (3.4), (3.7) and (3.11).
An important observation is that while the adoption of new technologies occurs at a slower
pace under competition between supply and demand, the level of technology adopted in that
market setting is higher. This might lead one to think that the long run productivity of the
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due to our simplifying assumption that rms can only buy a new technology once. As we
mentioned already, Doraszelski (2001) shows that the rm's decision problem, if we allow
the rm to change technologies more than once, is of the same form after each adoption of a
new technology. Hence, allowing the rms to buy new technologies more than once will still
mean that the switch to better technologies occurs later under competition between supply
and demand. Thus, long run productivity is still lower under competition between supply
and demand.
3.4 Comparative Statics
In Figure 3.1 some comparative static results are presented. The gure depicts the level of
technology adopted, , and the expected discount factor, which is our measure of the speed
at which new technologies are adopted. We explore the changes in these two variables when
the variance of the process governing the evolution of technologies , the trend or the expected
evolution of technology , and the interest rate r, change. The value of the parameters ;b;r
and 0 are set to the same values as in Farzin et. al. (1998). The value of ; and  are set
such that the expected discount factor implies a delay in the adoption of new technologies of
around 16 periods, which is about the value Farzin et al. (1998) use (17:79 periods in their
paper). The value the parameters we use are then  = 151:32;b = 1:25;r = 0:1;0 = 1; =
0; = 0:05 and  = 0:01.
From Figure 3.1 there are three facts that are worth noting. First, an increase in either
 or  has bigger eect in the level of the technology adopted when there is competition
between supply and demand. Hence, when only one side of the market holds all the power
the level of technology adopted is less sensitive to the process governing the evolution of
technologies. Markets for dierent technologies should exhibit more diverse behavior under
competition between supply and demand than when only one side holds all the market power.
A second feature that deserves attention is that as the interest rate rises, the level of
technology that is adopted tends to converge to the same value under both competition
between supply and demand and the case when only one side holds all the market power. This
means that in economies with high interest rates, the structure of the market for technologies
has less eect than when compared with low interest rate economies.
A third fact which the numerical analysis reveals is that the eects of the variance of
the process for technology, , has a small eect if any on the speed of adoption. That is,
industries where there the evolution of technologies is very random with big improvements
in short timespace and periods with almost no improvements should not in
uence the speed
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3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated how dierent market structures aect the speed at which new
technologies are adopted. A game between the demand side, rms buying technology, and
the supply side, rms selling technology, was presented. Three dierent market scenarios
were considered, one in which the supply holds all the market power, another in which the
demand holds all the market power, and a third setting where there is competition between
both supply and demand.
In our results, we explained how these three dierent market structures aect the adoption
of technologies. The speed of adoption when one side of the market holds all the market
power is the same independently of which side holds the power. However, when no side of
the economy has all the market power, the competition between supply and demand case,
then the adoption occurs at a slower pace. This suggests that competition between the two
sides of the market might decrease the speed of adoption and that competition within each
side might increase the speed of adoption.
The literature so far has only focused on the optimal timing of adoption of new technolo-
gies from the perspective of a rm that faces an exogenous process of technological change
where the price of new technologies is also exogenous. To our knowledge, this is the rst
paper that incorporates the pricing of new technologies as something endogenous that results
from the interaction between rms buying the technology and rms selling the technology.
Our results show interesting insights about the eects of the market structure on the adoption
of new technologies. The results found explain empirical phenomena often attributed to the
dierences in the technologies themselves. We show that market structure itself can account
for, at least some, of this observed phenomena.
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Appendix
3.A.1 Brownian Motion
Let z be a continuous random variable. Denote by z(t) the value of z at time t. We say that
z is a Brownian Motion if
1. z(0) = 0,
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3. z(t)   z(t   s)  N(0;t   s).
3.A.2 Derivation of the Expected Discount Factor
Note that, for a given , the only variable the expected discount factor depend on is the
current level of technology . Then we can dene the function f as
f() = E(e r):
If  =  then it is obvious that  = 0 and hence f() = 1. Assume then that  < .
Choose dt small enough so that  won't surpass  in the next time interval. Then we have
that the problem of computing the hitting time restarts at the point  + d. That is,
f() = e rdtE(f( + d))
= e rdt [f() + E(df())]: (3.12)
Given that  follows a Geometric Brownian Motion we can expand df() using It^ o's
Lemma. In this case we get




Note that E(dz) = 0. Furthermore, using the Taylor expansion and ignoring the terms
of order dt2 and higher we can state that e rdt = 1   dt. Hence,




Therefore, ignoring once more the terms of order equal or higher than dt2, we get that




Equation (3.13) is a second order linear dierential equation in f with the boundary
conditions f() = 1 and f() ! 0 as the dierence     becomes large. The general
solution to the second order linear dierential equation is given by
f() = C1 + C20
where  and 0 are the roots to the characteristic equation in x





Rivas, Javier (2008), Cooperation in Repeated Games, Bounded Rational Learning and the Adoption of Evolving Technologies 
European University Institute
 






















where  is given in equation (3.14). Recalling that f() = E(e r) gives the desired result.
3.A.3 Problem of the Firm from the Demand Side when the Demand Holds
All the Market Power






 ()e rsds   Ie r
:
























r E (1   e r) +
()
r E(e r)   IE(e r)
o
: (3.15)
Plugging in the value of E(e r), using the fact that I = C and dropping the constants
from the maximization problem we get that
max
   (()   (0)   rC):
3.A.4 Problem of the Firm from the Demand Side Under Competition be-
tween Supply and Demand
The same analysis applies here as in Appendix 3.A.3 to get equation (3.15). From this
equation, by pugging the value of E(e r) and dropping the constants from the maximization
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10.2870/26189Figure 3.1: Comparative Statics
The thick green line corresponds to the case where there is competition between supply and demand while
the thin blue line corresponds to the case where the market power lies with only one side of the economy.
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